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Manuel I of Byzantium (1143-80) has been unfairly judged as misguided, reckless, 
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imperial policy lacked any coherent strategy, and that Byzantium simply reacted to 
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analysis of Manuel’s imperial policy to demonstrate the emperor’s efficacy and 
strategic flexibility.  The perception, generally accepted by historians, that Manuel 
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AN INTRODUCTION TO BYZANTINE FOREIGN POLICY (1143-80) 
Manuel I Komnenos (1143-80) inherited an impressive military and political machine from 
his grandfather Alexios I (1081-1118) and father John II (1118-43).  At the apogee of 
Manuel’s career, he acknowledged the vassalage of all the Crusader states, the Seljuks of 
Rûm, the Hungarians, and the Serbs.  He also established a significant presence in Italy to 
counter growing German influence.  Soon after his death, however, the Byzantine court was 
almost paralyzed by plots and chaos, and within a quarter of a century it could not prevent 
the crusaders of 1204 from brutally sacking Constantinople, the city’s first such 
catastrophe in its nine-hundred-year history.  For over eight centuries, historians have 
attempted to explain how this dramatic turn of events could have occurred.  Many argue 
that Manuel I squandered the resources of his empire in order to complete an imperial 
policy that was increasingly unrealistic and overly ambitious.  The purpose of this work is 
to refute those claims.   
To answer the question of whether or not Manuel’s foreign policy was unrealistic 
and perhaps even pernicious to the empire, it is necessary to examine his career.  However, 
this examination must be conducted independent of the horrors of 1204.  How did Manuel 
justify his foreign policy and how did his contemporaries view him?  Manuel was 
exceptionally active given the limitations of his empire and was quick to adapt to the 
changing political landscape, including his setbacks.  This work will detail each of the 
decades of Manuel’s reign, discussing the emperor’s objectives and measuring his successes 
and failures.  The conclusion will offer an overall judgment of Manuel’s reign. 
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In order to accomplish this aim, it is necessary to discuss what has been said about 
Manuel Komnenos’s foreign policy and to adequately place this work within the 
historiography.  There are two primary sources contemporary to the reign of Manuel I. The 
first of these was the panegyric writer John Kinnamos who, as imperial secretary 
(gramatikos), was present for many of the emperor’s later campaigns.  His narrative is 
presented in a very matter-of-fact manner with occasional tangents and little analysis. 
Kinnamos’s firsthand knowledge permitted him to furnish rich detail regarding the 
emperor’s military campaigns that are simply not present in other accounts.  Unfortunately, 
his narrative breaks off in the spring of 1176 just before the disaster at Myriokephalon, 
thus preventing an analysis of these events or of Manuel’s rule in summary.   
The second source is the more critical Nicetas Choniates.  Choniates wrote his 
twenty-one book narrative after the 1204 fall of Constantinople from the safety of Nicaea.  
Choniates’ work is often religious and righteous in tone and one cannot escape the notion 
of Divine Providence as an explanation for the fall of the imperial capital—the Byzantines 
had strayed from God’s path and were being punished.  Choniates is quite critical of Manuel 
and his policies. However, the author’s attitude was mostly likely influenced by political 
circumstances.  The broken Komneni dynasty was a convenient scapegoat for the horrors 
of 1204.  The Angeloi family had established an “empire” based in Nicaea from the remains 
of Byzantium.  The Angeloi claimed dominion of a large swathe of the western Anatolian 
littoral, which included Choniates’ ancestral home of Chonai. Perhaps naturally, Choniates 
joined the Angeloi imperial service and sought to elevate the standing of the new dynasty at 
the expense of the Komnenoi, especially Manuel.  He admonished Manuel for what he 
perceived as wasteful spending, pointless intrigue in Italy, and sabotaging the efforts of the 
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Second Crusade in 1147. Choniates gives special attention to the emperor’s personal 
conduct.   For him, Manuel’s fascination with astrology and his various sexual indiscretions 
are indicative of the declining morality that prompted divine retribution.  Choniates, in his 
summation of Manuel’s reign, gives a stinging rebuke: “He had achieved nothing very 
notable for the empire and had made no provisions or arrangements for events following 
his death because he in no way would accept that death was near.”1 
 Modern historians have cited Choniates’ unflattering assessment of Manuel’s rule to 
portray the emperor in a distinctly negative manner.  One of the first modern historians to 
discuss the reign of Manuel Komnenos was Edward Gibbon.  A paragon of Enlightenment 
rationalism, Gibbon describes the Byzantines as foolish and mystical cowards.2  Regarding 
Manuel I, Gibbon is scathing in his criticism of Manuel’s handling of the Second Crusade.  
The German emperor made arrangements for safe passage through Byzantium and 
supplies to support his troops, “but every engagement was violated by [Manuel’s] treachery 
and injustice; and the complaints of the Latins are attested by the honest confession of a 
Greek historian.” The “honest” historian Gibbon is referring to is Nicetas Choniates.  Gibbon 
continues by suggesting that Manuel conspired with the Seljuk Turks to destroy the armies 
of Louis VII of France and Conrad of the German Empire. 3 
During the late nineteenth century, a romantic form of Hellenism developed in 
tandem with the Greek War of Independence.  The writers of this period included George 
                                                          
1 Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas Choniates, Trans. H. G. Magoulias (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1984), 124. 
2 Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (New York: Penguin 
Classics, 1996), 3: 560-74. 
3 Ibid., 3: 620-5. 
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Finlay and Constantine Paparregopoulos.  While their arguments varied, they shared 
sentiments of uncritical Greek nationalism.  In regards to Manuel Komnenos’s foreign 
policy, Paparregopoulos argues that the emperor’s relationship with the crusader states 
weakened the Byzantine state and that coexistence between the Latins and the Greeks was 
impossible.4  Finlay regarded the reign of the Komneni, especially Manuel, as dangerous in 
that it allowed insidious Latin influences to corrupt the empire.5  Perhaps the most prolific 
historian of the period, Frédéric Chalandon, sums up the emperor’s reign with the 
judgment that “the decline of the empire … began with Manuel.”6   
It is worth noting that the veracity of Greek nationalism obscures that fact that 
Manuel did not have a viable alternative to collusion with the crusaders.  Direct annexation 
would have been exceedingly expensive and dangerous.  Byzantine possession of 
Jerusalem, for instance, would have soured cordial relations with the various atabegs of 
Syria.  Manuel’s alliance with the crusaders is indicative of the pragmatism of his imperial 
policy.  Manuel sought to insulate his empire with friendly buffer states.   Manuel hoped 
that the crusaders could keep his rivals on the eastern flank at bay.  While the crusaders 
ultimately failed to do this, alliance with the crusaders was his best option.   Manuel’s 
position vis-à-vis the crusaders was noted by the papacy with approval and permitted 
Byzantium to remain at peace with the Aleppo and Damascus. 
                                                          
4 Paul Magdalino, The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos (1143-1180) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 15. 
5 George Finlay, A History of Greece from the Roman Conquest to the Present Time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1877), 3: 145-58. 
6 Ferdinand Chalandon, Les Comnène: Ètudes sur l'Empire byzantin aux XIe et XIIe siècles, ii: Jean II 
Comnène (1118-43) et Manuel I Comnène (1143-80) (New York: Burt Franklin Research and Source Works, 
1971), 2:607. 
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Chalandon’s assessment of Manuel’s place in the Komneni revival remains the 
standard in Byzantine political historiography and has been cited by numerous historians 
of the twentieth century.  French historian Louis Bréhier continues Chalandon’s 
assessment: “The error of Manuel was that he believed that circumstances allowed for him 
to return the empire to its ancient power … however his grand style of policy extended his 
forces so greatly that he could never achieve anything but partial and limited success.”7  
The Yugoslavian Byzantinist George Ostrogorsky concludes that the entire imperial 
program was unsound: “It was useless for him to triumph over the Latin states in the East 
to achieve brilliant successes in Hungary, and for a time even occupy extensive territory in 
Italy; to maintain his position in all these fields and to pursue an active and indeed an 
aggressive policy in European and Near Eastern spheres of influence was clearly 
impossible.”8  The Russian historian A. A. Vasiliev argues that while the real decline of 
Byzantium began in 1025 with Basil II, “the first two Comneni, Alexius and John, succeeded 
in retarding the progress of the decline, but they failed to stop it.  The erroneous policy of 
Manuel led the Empire again into the path of decline and this time into definite 
decadence.”9 
If the imperial policy of the empire was structurally unsound, then the battle of 
Myriokephalon in 1176 was the event that brought down the proverbial house of cards.  
Vasiliev suggests that it “definitely destroyed Byzantium’s last hope of expelling the Turks 
                                                          
7 Louis Bréhier, Le monde byzantin (Paris: le Grand livre du mois, 1998), 1:328-9. 
8 George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State. 2nd ed. Trans. Joan Hussey (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1969), 391. 
9 A. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire. 2nd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1952), 2:432. 
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from Asia Minor.”10  Kugler declares that “the battle of Myriokephalon decided forever the 
destiny of the whole East.”11  The great historian of the Crusades, Steven Runciman, 
provides a somber portrait of the military situation of Byzantium after the battle:  “There 
were troops enough left to defend the frontiers and even win a few petty victories in the 
next three years.  But nevermore would the Emperor be able to march into Syria and 
dictate his will at Antioch.”12 
The past two decades have witnessed a change in perspective regarding both 
Manuel’s foreign policy and the implications of the battle of Myriokephalon.  German 
historian R. J. Lilie began this trend by noting that the battle had limited direct 
consequences and that the greatest effect was a loss of prestige for the emperor.  For Lilie, 
it was “questionable whether, apart from any gain in prestige, success at Myriokephalon 
would indeed have allowed Manuel to reach his objectives.”13  Prestige was an important 
component of medieval power mechanics and diplomacy and is essentially a testament of 
the power and honor of a political entity.  An increase of Byzantine prestige made vassalage 
more attractive for minor powers, alliance more attractive for powers that were worthy, 
and conflict less so for Byzantium’s rivals.  This was certainly an ideal worth fighting for in 
a medieval state in search of glory. 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 2:429. 
11 Bernhard Kugler, Studien zur Geschichte des zweiten Kruuzzuges (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1973), 222. 
12 Steven Runciman, The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish East 1100-1187, Vol. 2,  A History of 
the Crusades (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 413-4. 
13 Ralph-Johannes Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States (1096-1204). Trans. J. C. Morris and Jean E. 
Ridings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 214-5. 
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Lilie also argues that Manuel was quite successful in his dealings with the Crusader 
states and used them to support his agenda.  The Scottish historian Michael Angold states 
that, “The defeat at Myriokephalon therefore appears not to have been a major disaster.  
Almost nothing was lost and the Byzantines proved quite capable of meeting Turkish 
pressure on their Anatolian frontier.”  Angold argues that Manuel’s policy did become 
increasingly unrealistic, but the “underlying concept was extremely perceptive.”  Manuel’s 
failure was placing influence among the Latins above the immediate interests of his 
empire.14  The British historian Paul Magdalino further develops this trend by stating that 
Myriokephalon was not a defeat on the scale of Manzikert.  In fact, Manuel failed to meet 
the generous conditions set down by Kiliҫ Arslan after the battle and destroyed the army 
that Arslan sent to enforce them.  Manuel also managed to inflict a number of other stinging 
defeats on the Seljuks, leading several of these campaigns himself.  Magdalino concludes by 
arguing that Manuel’s foreign policy was complex and adaptive to political and military 
circumstances.15   
However, the argument that Myriokephalon was an unmitigated disaster persists.  
The recent edition of Timothy Gregory’s survey of Byzantine history states that “The Battle 
of Myriokephalon was a disaster on a level with that of Mantzikert a century earlier.  
Despite his earlier successes, Manuel’s foreign policy completely disintegrated after 1176, 
especially in the face of obvious success of the Turks in Asia Minor.”  Gregory summarizes 
Manuel’s rule: “In the end, Manuel’s involvement in western affairs stretched the military 
                                                          
14 Michael Angold, The Byzantine Empire: 1025-1204. 2nd ed. (London: Longman Publishers, 1997), 
224. 
15 Magdalino, 98-9, 104-5. 
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and diplomatic resources of the empire beyond what they could bear and led to a 
weakening of the central state.”16 
This is the context in which this work is placed.  It continues the work of Angold and 
Magdalino but seeks to extend the argument against claims that Manuel’s imperial policy 
was unrealistic.  Additionally, it seeks to continue the work of Lilie by arguing that the 
Anatolian expedition of the 1170s was the culmination of the Byzantine crusading ethic 
that Manuel used to solidify ties to the West.  The setback Manuel experienced at 
Myriokephalon was rendered permanent only because of the emperor’s illness and 
subsequent death not long thereafter.  Manuel I Komnenos was indeed shamelessly 
nepotistic, brutally autocratic, and a political opportunist, as many historians have argued.  
However, he was also a brave and cunning warrior emperor who fought his opponents 
skillfully with sword and diplomacy and brought renewed vigor and vision to a war 
machine created by his grandfather and father. 
The chapters in this thesis are organized by decade and will detail the emperor’s 
foreign activity throughout his different spheres of influence.  Chapter 1 addresses 
Manuel’s rise to power and his major trials of the 1140s.  It focuses primarily on his 
handling of the Second Crusade, but also treats some minor engagements with the 
Armenians, Antioch, and Ikonion.  Manuel was, in fact, at least partially responsible for the 
French failure in the Second Crusade; he intentionally torpedoed the expedition because 
the presence of Louis VII in Outremer represented a direct challenge to his authority, 
especially in Antioch.  The Second Crusade represents a major development in the 
                                                          
16 Timothy Gregory, A History of Byzantium 2nd. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 307-8.  
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emperor’s foreign policy.  From 1147 until his death, Manuel Komnenos believed the West 
was a vital tool for the success of his empire.  Manuel attempted to harness the power of 
the West by maintaining feudal ties to the Crusader states.  If they recognized Manuel as 
their lord, the Crusaders would be obliged to provide support for his military campaigns.  
Additionally, they could expect Manuel to come to their aid if needed.  While this was 
mutually beneficial to both parties, it was the Byzantines who stood to gain prestige from 
this arrangement.   
Chapter 2 examines the 1150s, which were heavily influenced by Manuel’s 
preoccupation with Italy.  Because of the considerable resources that he devoted to 
creating a Byzantine protectorate in southern Italy and destabilizing Sicily, Manuel enacted 
a strategy of diplomatic containment everywhere else.  The relative neglect of frontier 
zones such as Cilicia and Antioch eventually gave the Byzantines trouble, but the emperor 
was determined to see the Italian campaign to its end.  The exception to this policy was in 
the Balkans where, because of its proximity, the emperor was obliged to settle any 
conflagration there immediately.  This period is significant because Manuel experienced the 
first stings of failure and necessarily modified his strategy.  After the death of Emperor 
Conrad, the German Empire under Frederic Barbarossa was decidedly cold in its dealings 
with Byzantium. This change in attitude, combined with Venetian intransigence and 
Byzantine blunders, resulted in the failure of the Italian campaign after the Battle of 
Brindisi in 1158. However, Manuel responded to this failure by adapting his foreign policy 
and sought to salvage resources previously spent.  The emperor largely abandoned his goal 
of controlling Italy outright and instead sought to forge an alliance with Sicily to counter 
rising German influence. 
10 
 
Chapter 3 covers the period from 1160 until 1168, the pinnacle of the Komneni 
revival and the height of political activity.  Freed of the heavy burden of Italian operations, 
Manuel was able to respond to any challenge to his authority within his sphere of influence.  
During this period, the emperor sought to maintain his prestige and authority in the face of 
challenges.  The first such challenge came in the form of increased raiding from nomadic 
Turkomen raiders, ghazi, along the northern Anatolian littoral.  A punitive expedition to 
Ikonion, in which Antiochene auxiliaries were used, trounced the Seljuks in 1162, forcing 
Kiliҫ Arslan to sue for peace and come to Manuel as a suppliant.  Although the Seljuks 
remained a continuous thorn in Manuel’s side, they accepted client status.  The second 
punitive campaign was Manuel’s expedition directed towards the Balkans, where the 
Hungarians continued to be a disruption.  In 1167, at Sirmium, Manuel achieved his 
greatest victory.  This expedition quieted the Hungarians for the rest of his reign. 
Chapter 4 addresses the final period of Manuel I’s reign and life, 1169-1180.  For 
many historians, the value of Manuel’s contributions to his empire is determined here.  
Shortly after his death, the Komneni political system collapsed, and all that he and his 
grandfather and father had worked for were largely erased.  Rather than being “chancy 
ventures” that “were proof of how unrealistic his foreign policy was becoming”, the 
Egyptian and Anatolian campaigns during this period were indicative of the considerable 
strength of the military and political machine created since Manzikert and provided an idea 
as to how Manuel envisioned reconquering territories that had been lost to Byzantium in 
the past.17 
                                                          
17 Angold, 225. 
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The first of these campaigns was the ill-fated adventure to Egypt in 1169.  This was, 
in theory, a joint venture between Amalric of Jerusalem and the Byzantines for the 
dismantling of the ailing Fatimid Caliphate before the forces of Nur ad-Din were able to 
gain a foothold in the area.  If they had been able to pull this off, it would have brought 
great prestige to Manuel and returned some of the most lucrative areas of Egypt’s 
Mediterranean coast to Constantinople.  However, Amalric appears to have resented 
Byzantine involvement and believed he could handle the situation himself.  His actions 
sabotaged Manuel’s plans, and Manuel can hardly be faulted for this failure. 
In the mid-1170s, Manuel realized that he had given the Seljuks too much of a free 
hand in Anatolia for too long.  Although nominally a client state for the past decade, Kiliҫ 
Arslan violated the terms of his agreement by attacking another group of Turks, the 
Danishmendids, without turning over the conquered lands to Manuel.  Whether or not 
Manuel expected this to actually happen is a matter of debate, but it certainly gave the 
emperor a pretext for war.  In this case, Manuel did not just plan a punitive raid but rather 
the complete subjugation of Arslan and the capture of his capital at Ikonion.  He styled this 
campaign along the Western ideals of crusading.  While a single campaign would not have 
been enough to erase a century of Seljuk migration into Anatolia, it would have increased 
Manuel’s authority and prestige both in the east and west to unparalleled heights.   
It is difficult to look at Manuel’s failure at Myriokephalon and not assume that it is 
indicative of an entirely flawed strategy.  Regardless of how much attention has been paid 
to this single engagement, however, Myriokephalon was a moderate setback.  Ikonion did 
not, as some historians have argued, simply fail to follow up their great victory with further 
12 
 
conquests.  Manuel took the opportunity away from them.  Indeed, the Byzantine army 
inflicted a serious defeat on the Seljuks along the River Meander shortly afterwards.  The 
strength of the Komneni military machine rendered Myriokephalon irrelevant.  Had Manuel 
lived long enough to try again, or had the political system not collapsed after his death, 
another attempt to take Ikonion could have been made. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE ASCENSION OF MANUEL I KOMNENOS AND HIS FIRST TRIALS 
Manuel was clad in the purple mantle at a time when the empire was at a crossroads.  His 
father John had nearly succeeded in wresting control of Antioch from the Crusaders, and 
Byzantine control of Anatolia was its strongest in decades.  However, after Manuel came to 
power in 1143, the enemies of the empire rose to challenge Byzantium along every border.  
The first of these challengers was the recalcitrant Raymond of Antioch (1115-49).  In 1144, 
Raymond demanded the cession of several towns and forts in Byzantine Cilicia.  In 1146, 
Masud I (1116-56), the sultan of Rûm, embarked on a campaign of aggressive raids along 
his western and Cilician borders.  In 1147, Manuel I contended with the arrival of the 
Second Crusade, which consisted of two vast armies, one under French King Louis VII 
(1137-80) and the other under German Emperor Conrad III (1138-52).  Concurrently, 
Roger II (1095-1154) of Sicily took advantage of Manuel’s preoccupation with the 
crusaders and launched a series of devastating attacks on Corfu, Thebes, and Corinth.  In 
1148, Manuel repulsed a Cuman raid in the heart of the empire and, in 1149, launched a 
punitive expedition against the Serbs.  Manuel was exceptionally busy during the first 
decade of his reign.  
This period is essentially a test of the will and capability of the new emperor.  By the 
end of 1149, Manuel had passed the tests presented by his challengers.  Also, he gained a 
reputation of being an active and capable general and began to develop his own imperial 
program.  This program was quite different from his father’s and grandfather’s, but it kept 
with the Komneni tradition of pragmatism and far-sightedness.   
14 
 
Manuel and Raymond of Antioch: the vengeance of the Komneni 
The Normans of southern Italy posed a serious threat to the Byzantine western frontier.  In 
1081, Alexios I was humiliated by Robert Guiscard, duke of Calabria and Apulia, at the 
battle of Dyrrhachium.18  The Normans were evicted from the Adriatic coast only with great 
difficulty.  Robert’s son, Bohemond I, illegally annexed Antioch during the First Crusade in 
1098.  The Treaty of Devol, signed in 1108, should have brought the matter to a close, as it 
stated that Antioch would return to Constantinople as a protectorate after Bohemond’s 
death.19  Bohemond’s nephew Tancred, however, failed to honor the conditions of the 
treaty and ruled in his uncle’s place after 1111, much to the consternation of Alexios.  
Tancred even expanded the borders of Antioch at the expense of Byzantine Cilicia.  The 
Komneni were not in a position to retaliate against the Normans in Outremer until the 
1130s under John II.  John humbled Raymond of Antioch in 1138 but could not attain 
complete victory because of the intervention of Joscelin II of Edessa.  John planned to 
return to Outremer for a decisive campaign against all of the crusader states but died in 
1143.  Raymond viewed the death of John II and the advent of Manuel, seemingly pro-
Western, as a fortuitous turn of events.  Manuel would shatter Raymond’s optimism. 
 Kinnamos states that one of Manuel’s first actions after securing the throne was to 
punish Raymond for crimes against his father.20  Choniates glosses over the Antioch 
expedition with a confused chronology, placing an expedition against Ikonion before the 
attack on Raymond.  He agrees with Kinnamos that the expedition was punitive in nature 
                                                          
18 Anna Comnena, The Alexiad. Trans. E. R. A. Sewter (London: Penguin Classics, 1969), 139-150. 
19 Magdalino, 29. 
20 John Kinnamos, Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus. Trans. Charles M. Brand (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1976), 35. 
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but concludes the event with Manuel simply shoring up his defense in Cilicia.  Most likely, 
Choniates confuses the Antiochene expedition with an effort to fortify Bithynia (the region 
of Anatolia just across the Bosphorus from Constantinople). 21   
In 1144, Manuel sent a large force to attack Raymond on land and sea.  The 
Antiochene hold on Cilicia withered in the face of a superior Byzantine force.  Manuel’s 
generals then won a series of dashing victories in Antioch.  Kinnamos believes that “these 
disasters constrained Raymond to travel the road to Byzantion.”22  However, he overlooks 
the fact that Raymond’s journey to pay homage to Manuel and accept vassalage occurred 
just months after the crusader’s disheartening loss of Edessa to the atabeg of Aleppo and 
Mosul, Zengi, in December of 1144.  Raymond could not resist the growing menace to his 
east while making trouble for Byzantium.   
Manuel may have wished to complete Raymond’s humiliation and outright conquer 
Antioch or even push further south towards Jerusalem, but his current situation forbade it.  
Zengi was too powerful.  Any protracted action in Outremer by Manuel would invite him to 
press his gains.  The emperor achieved a two-fold victory in accepting the vassalage of 
Raymond.  First, he avenged the tremendous insults of the Normans by forcing Raymond to 
approach him as a suppliant.  Second, he intended to harness the power of the Normans 
and reap the benefits of prestige without the dangers associated with direct annexation.  
Furthermore, this was an ideal solution, as it brought matters in Outremer to a quick 
conclusion.  Manuel answered a long standing affront to Byzantine honor and created a 
largely unified bloc in the face of Zengi’s aggression. 
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Manuel rides against Ikonion 
The Seljuks of Rûm posed a particular danger to the Byzantines because of their extensive 
frontier and a chronic Byzantine difficulty in adapting to Turkish warfare.  While the 
Komneni managed to recover the Anatolian littoral and even a significant portion in the 
west, the Seljuks were still firmly in control of the interior of Anatolia.  Masud I (1116-56) 
capitalized on Manuel’s inability to adequately defend such a long frontier and conducted 
numerous raids.  Additionally, frequent ghazu raids by nomadic Turks were becoming 
especially damaging, and Manuel sought to limit their effectiveness.  After settling matters 
in Antioch, Manuel turned his attention to Ikonion. 
 In 1146, the emperor planned a punitive raid against the Seljuks.  Kinnamos 
provides an exchange between Manuel and Masud in which the emperor politely addresses 
Masud and lists his grievances.23  Manuel identifies the Seljuks’ occupation of Prakana, 
frequent raids, and fighting the Danishmendids – a Byzantine ally in northeast Anatolia.  
The sultan responded by, in effect, daring Manuel to invade.  In Kinnamos’s account of the 
subsequent war, the emperor nearly single-handedly defeated the entire Seljuk force, and 
Masud scampered back to his capital in terror.  At Ikonion, Masud was saved from Manuel’s 
siege by the arrival of an allied force, whereupon Manuel was forced to retreat.  Kinnamos 
provides a lengthy description of the Byzantine retreat and Manuel’s personal bravery and 
prowess.24  Choniates simply writes that Manuel charged off to Ikonion and, after reaching 
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the walls quite easily, simply turned around.  On his return trip, he was ambushed a 
number of times and retreated to Constantinople with difficulty.25 
 It appears that the emperor simply bungled the assault on Masud.  However, 
Kinnamos provides some additional insight into the emperor’s thinking at the time.  
Manuel had recently concluded marriage negations with the Germans and wedded Bertha 
of Sulzbach, the daughter of a German count.  The new husband was keen to impress his 
Latin observers and envisioned himself a crusader champion.  This attack on Masud was, in 
essence, a demonstration for the West.  In regards to the emperor’s action, Kinnamos cites 
the need to the emperor for personal glory: “The one army of Romans was already 
suffering difficulties around the camp, but the emperor, impelled by his youth, and having 
not long since wedded a wife, himself desired to achieve something in battle, according to 
their custom.  For the Latin who has just taken a wife, not to appear noble brings no 
common disgrace.”26 
Kinnamos continues by criticizing the efforts of the Byzantine soldiers who acted 
cowardly in the face of adversity.27  When describing Manuel’s conflict with the Seljuks, 
Kinnamos clearly portrays the emperor as a superior general leading an inferior, if not 
unwilling, army.  According to Choniates, the emperor received word in the summer of 
1146 that another crusader force was preparing to avenge the loss of Edessa.28  Kinnamos 
does not introduce word of the Second Crusade until after the Seljuks sued for peace in the 
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face of a massive campaign planned by the emperor.29  It is unclear whether or not Manuel 
was aware of this before he retreated from the walls of Ikonion, but the potential arrival of 
a large crusading army would certainly explain the pace of his haphazard withdrawal.  The 
crusaders of 1098-9 had been a dangerous and disruptive force that threatened the 
security of Byzantium.  Manuel had to prepare the empire to deal with another such 
expedition of Franks.  The confusion with the timeline notwithstanding, Manuel extracted 
his forces from Anatolia without loss to his prestige and also enhanced his own personal 
honor in the eyes of the West by establishing his role as an active crusader.30  Perhaps most 
importantly, he ended hostilities with Masud quickly, allowing him to devote his attention 
to the threat to his west. 
The Second Crusade 
Manuel received word sometime in late 1146 or early 1147 that the massive host, later 
known as the Second Crusade, was bound for Outremer and that it would pass through his 
lands.  In many ways, the First Crusade had been a nightmare for the Byzantines.  The 
Norman crusaders raided imperial lands, established a network of Latin states in violation 
of oaths they swore to Emperor Alexios, and even dared to attack the walls of the great city 
itself.  If there was any doubt in the emperor’s mind as to the severity of the situation, his 
aunt Anna Komnene could remind him, for she was present for the First Crusade and wrote 
                                                          
29 Kinnamos, 58. 
30
 Magdalino, 42, 510. See Magnate “patrons” under Manuel named in verse collections.  Specifically, 
Manganeios Prodromos No. 25. 
19 
 
about it extensively in her Alexiad.31  Manuel, like his grandfather, believed he could 
harness the power of the crusaders but would not allow them to disrupt his plans. 
 Both Choniates and Kinnamos agree that Manuel tirelessly worked to ensure that 
his empire was ready for the coming threat.  One of his first acts was to respond to the 
French proclamation to join the crusade by reminding the French monarch that Byzantium 
was the only major power fighting on behalf of the crusader states.  Additionally, the 
emperor was quick to exact oaths of friendly intentions from both the Germans, led by 
Conrad III, and the French, led by Louis VII.32   The Germans were the first to travel into 
Byzantine lands, but relations between them and the Byzantines disintegrated quickly and 
disastrously.  Choniates states that there was no cause for ill will until opportunistic 
Byzantine merchants began cheating German troops.  The Germans, in response, started 
raiding poorly defended Byzantine towns for supplies.  The situation came to a crisis when 
a kinsman of Conrad was murdered by thieves in Adrianople.  Manuel’s general, Prosuch, 
contained this incident before it escalated further, but there was considerable ill will on 
both sides.33  Kinnamos, by contrast, blamed the advent of hostilities on Germans who were 
pillaging the countryside.34  
 The rapid arrival of an army of 20,000 Germans was problematic for Manuel.35  He 
did not have the time to prepare the vast resources required to adequately provision such a 
large army.  In theory, the German and Byzantine empires were allied through marriage.  
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However, Conrad did not approach Constantinople as a friend.  First, there is no evidence 
that Conrad established any arrangement with Manuel prior to his entry into Byzantine 
lands.  This was a surprising affront to Byzantine imperial authority.  If Manuel had 
sufficient warning of the German advance, he could have positioned troops along the route 
to safeguard and monitor the German march.  Also, both Louis and Conrad considered 
themselves as heirs of Charlemagne and thus, the emperors of Rome – an honor claimed by 
Byzantine emperors since the late fifth century.  Conrad’s claim was more threatening as he 
was Pope Eugenius III’s (1145-53) most trusted ally in northern Italy.36  Conrad likely 
intended for the crusade to strengthen his position as the preeminent Christian monarch.  
In fact, after 1148, Conrad began referring to himself as the rex Romanorum augustus.37   
Kinnamos details the German emperor’s continued arrogance and belligerent 
attitude after suffering several humiliating defeats by the Byzantines on the road to 
Constantinople.  Conrad’s nephew, Frederick Barbarossa, further enflamed matters by 
launching an attack on the capital itself.  Prosuch, again, saved the day and inflicted 
substantial casualties upon the Germans.  Once Conrad was humbled before the gates of 
Constantinople, he and his army were quickly ferried across the Bosphorus.   
Kinnamos states that Manuel sent the commander of the Varangian Guard 
(akolouthos) to offer Conrad an alliance.  This alliance would naturally serve to ensure that 
any lands conquered would return to Byzantine hands.  Conrad rejected these terms and 
was left to his own devices.   The Germans foolishly charged headlong into a Seljuk scouting 
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force and were subsequently obliterated in a protracted battle at Doryleum.38  Choniates is 
decidedly angry at Manuel for the Byzantine treatment of the Germans: 
The emperor’s purpose was neither in doubt nor was it cast in the shadow of the 
curtain of falsehood; he minted debased silver coinage which he offered to the 
Italian troops to pay for their needs.  In short, every ill the emperor himself had 
contrived was present, and he commanded others to inflict such harm so that these 
things should be indelible memories for posterity, deterrents against attacking the 
Romans.  It also occurred to the Turks to act similarly against the Germans once 
Manuel had stirred them up with letters and incited them to make war.39 
The German army was indeed destroyed, but Choniates’ assumption that Manuel bears the 
responsibility for its defeat is misguided.  First, Conrad was not in the vicinity of 
Constantinople long enough for Byzantium to inflict any great harm to his army; he 
engaged, and was defeated by, the Seljuks under Mamplanes almost immediately after 
crossing the Bosphorus.40  Second, the Seljuks did not need any incentive or pressure to 
attack a Christian force marauding through Anatolia.  The critical blow to Choniates’ 
credibility is the manner in which he describes the defeat of the German army.  Choniates 
details a successful German attack on the Turks in Phrygia and then that asserts the 
Germans were slaughtered along the River Meander – the fate associated with the French 
later in 1147.41  Finally, the circumstances simply do not correlate with Choniates’ analysis.  
The speed of the German advance caught the Byzantines off guard.  Manuel believed the 
best strategy was to transport the Germans across the Bosphorus as quickly as possible to 
limit the dangers of their presence. 
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  After the German defeat at Doryleum, Conrad and the remnants of his army joined 
the French contingent at Nicaea.  Late in 1147, Conrad fell ill, whereupon Manuel invited 
him to come to Constantinople to recover.  The emperor personally tended the ailing 
German monarch and kept him in luxury while Louis made his way to Outremer.  Conrad 
was impressed by Manuel’s charms and hospitality.  When Conrad was well enough, 
Manuel provided him with ships and a suitable escort to make the journey to the Holy 
Land.42  Furthermore, the two emperors spent several months together at the end of 1148 
where they planned an alliance against Roger of Sicily.  
Additionally, Conrad pledged southern Italy to Manuel as a dowry for Manuel’s 
bride, Bertha.43   Such an alliance would have been impossible if Conrad felt betrayed in the 
slightest by Manuel.  The German historian, Otto of Freising, leaves no hint of Byzantine 
treachery in his simple analysis of the Second Crusade: “although it was not good for the 
enlargement of boundaries or for the advantage of bodies, yet it was good for the salvation 
of many souls.”44  Manuel not only neutralized the German threat, but also secured an ally 
on his western flank. 
The passage of the French crusaders under Louis was significantly smoother.  
Manuel was able to adequately provision the towns along the road to Constantinople to 
prevent any of the issues experienced during the German march.  Louis was lavishly 
entertained in Constantinople.  Even the decidedly hostile Odo of Deuil was impressed by 
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Byzantine generosity.45  Once the French were ferried across the Bosphorus, however, the 
happy arrangement began to crumble.  Manuel offered Louis the same terms he gave 
Conrad – essentially a Byzantine led-alliance.   The French deemed this proposal insulting 
and dismissed it as such.46 
The French were in a far better position to advance towards Outremer than the 
Germans.  The army of approximately 15,000 was intact, and its commanders were united 
in Christian zeal.47  Also, because of Byzantine logistical support, the French were well 
provisioned.  Precisely because of the strength of Louis’s army, Manuel had to compromise 
the success of its expedition.  Why would Manuel risk his prestige in the west to bring 
harm, even indirectly, to his fellow Christians?  The answer represents the pinnacle of 
Komneni pragmatism. 
Manuel hoped, like his grandfather before him, that he could use the French force to 
strike indirectly against Ikonion.  If Louis had accepted this tenet, it is likely that he would 
have found Manuel considerably more accommodating.  A French strike against Masud 
would have been ideal.  If he succeeded, he would have been obliged to continue the 
pilgrimage toward Outremer, leaving Manuel in a position to follow up with his own 
victories.  A French failure would bring no harm to the empire.  Unfortunately for both 
Manuel and Louis, the French monarch was far too pious to allow any distraction from his 
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ultimate objective – the successful completion of his journey to the holy land.  Louis was 
determined to follow the path of the First Crusade half a century  prior.   
The French obsession with the Levant troubled Manuel.  If a Latin force succeeded in 
capturing Edessa, or any other province, it was possible, if not certain, that it would 
establish yet another crusader state.  This would have frustrated Manuel’s plans for 
hegemony in Outremer.  A potential change in vassalage represented the most serious 
threat to Manuel’s power in the Latin east.  The emperor had just recently cemented his 
hold upon Antioch, and the fall of Edessa forced all of Outremer to look towards 
Constantinople for defense.  If Louis VII accepted the homage of Raymond of Antioch or 
King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, Manuel would no longer be able to legally intervene in 
Outremer.  Therefore, Manuel was obliged to prevent Louis from arriving in force no 
matter the cost.   
In the beginning of 1148, the French and the remaining German crusaders departed 
from Ephesus on the western coast of the Anatolian peninsula.  As they progressed further 
away from Constantinople, food became more and more scarce.  Also, Turkish attacks 
became more frequent, culminating in a devastating attack at the Cadmos Mountains.  The 
raid was repulsed, but the French sustained heavy casualties.48  The extent of the French 
losses and the shortage of supplies induced Louis to leave the army and travel to Outremer 
by ship.  His men were left to fend for themselves.  Nearly half the crusader force fell to 
deprivation or Turkish arrows.  The puny force that made it to Antioch in March of 1148 
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was but a shadow of the impressive French army.49  Louis exacerbated his ineffectiveness 
by falling into internecine crusader politics and a particularly nasty incident involving his 
wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine.50  The Second Crusade ended in a blaze of folly when the 
combined forces of France, Jerusalem, Antioch, and Tripoli launched a fruitless assault 
upon Damascus.  The attack not only failed but also served to push Damascus into a 
reluctant alliance with Mosul and Aleppo.   
The French blamed Manuel for their failure.  There are numerous charges of 
Byzantine treachery against the French.  Louis VII himself states that the disaster was 
because of “the treachery of the Emperor and also our own fault.”51   Kinnamos suspiciously 
glosses over the French campaign in Anatolia.  Choniates lambastes Manuel for his betrayal 
of the common Christian good, and portrays Louis VII in a distinctly positive light.52  Odo of 
Deuil is overtly hostile towards Manuel. Specifically, he accuses Manuel of not supplying 
the French with enough food, conspiring with his merchants to cheat the French, and not 
providing ample transportation to Outremer after the battle at Cadmos.  His most serious 
charge is that Manuel allied with the Turks to fight his fellow Christians. 53    
Steven Runciman notes that it would have been impossible for a medieval state to 
provision two large armies on such a short notice; the shortage of food caused a steep 
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increase in prices.54  Christopher Tyerman asserts that  western expectations were inflated 
at the onset of the enterprise: 
The amount of effective assistance Manuel could provide, especially on and beyond 
the frontier regions of western Asia Minor, would always fall short of the 
westerners’ expectations raised by Manuel’s own promises, the awesome scale of 
his capital, the excessive dress of imperial servants and the deliberately intimidating 
but gorgeous court ritual and entertainment.55 
It was unreasonable for Odo of Deuil to expect the Byzantines to transport an entire army 
to Outremer from the small port of Attaleia (on the south-west coast) to Outremer in the 
middle of winter.  Manuel did, in fact, maintain a peaceful relationship with Masud after his 
retreat from Ikonion in 1146.  He did not trust either Masud or the crusaders.  He 
attempted to establish a framework that would have allowed the crusaders to continue 
their journey under Byzantine direction.  The uninvited crusaders disrespected his 
authority and disturbed his lands.  Moreover, the Normans of Sicily were making trouble in 
the Aegean.  Once Manuel’s offer of an alliance was rebuffed, he saw no reason to break his 
peace with Ikonion.  Odo of Deuil likely exaggerates when he states that Byzantine troops 
fought alongside the Turks, but some sort of Byzantine-Turkish collusion was very likely.  
Manuel’s handling of the crusaders was rather ingenious.  He neutralized the threat 
without directly acting against them.  Conrad promised to be a valuable ally after he was 
humiliated at Doryleum.  Manuel had no use for Louis and abandoned him to his fate. 
Manuel had sought to prevent the embarrassment of the First Crusade from 
recurring by offering the French and German leaders of the Second Crusade two options – 
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succeed under Byzantine auspices or suffer an ignominious defeat without them.  Louis VII 
and Conrad III were both far too proud to accept the former.  Manuel understood that while 
the Latin forces marched with pride, they would likely not accept any Byzantine counsel.  
He hoped that, after they had been humiliated enough and experienced some privation on 
the Anatolian frontier, they would be more receptive to an alliance.  Neither side took the 
bait.  The Germans were woefully unprepared and lacked an adequate understanding of the 
current situation in Anatolia or Outremer to accomplish anything of merit.  They proved 
incapable of succeeding under their own power.  The unmitigated disaster of the French 
expedition and the failed siege of Damascus proved to the Franks of Outremer that 
Byzantium was the only force capable of ensuring their protection and any further success.   
Manuel perceptively applied the lessons learned from the First Crusade to his 
predicament with the French and German monarchs.  He understood how dangerous the 
crusading spirit was and how quickly it could take a decidedly anti-Greek turn.  Kinnamos 
notes that the greatest success of the emperor during the crusade was keeping Louis and 
Conrad separate almost throughout the entirety of the campaign.56  Some historians have 
argued that the failure of the Second Crusade forever soured relations between Byzantium 
and the West and gave future justification for the crusaders of 1204 to brutally sack 
Constantinople.  However, this assertion is problematic.  First, the West did not need any 
incentive for further hatred or distrust of Byzantium.  Leaders in the French camp called for 
an attack on Constantinople well before any alleged Byzantine impropriety.  One of these 
leaders, Godfrey of Langres, cited John II’s expedition against Antioch as justification for 
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such an attack on the city.57  The friendly ties and intermarriage between the French and 
the Normans of Sicily ensured that many French nobles were accustomed to despising 
Byzantium well before the Second Crusade.   
Second, the result of the crusade did not dramatically alter western perceptions of 
Byzantium.  Constantinople was still “arrogant in her wealth, treacherous in her practices, 
corrupt in her faith; just as she fears everyone on account of her wealth, she is dreaded by 
everyone because of her treachery and faithlessness.”58  While Odo of Deuil’s hysterical 
critique of Byzantium was the accepted norm in the West, this did not make the events of 
1204 a natural reaction of the Second Crusade.  Indeed, Tyerman notes that while the fleet 
of the Fourth Crusade sailed with warlike intentions towards Constantinople, Pope 
Innocent III (1198-1216) expressly forbade any attack on Constantinople.59  Thus, it is 
unlikely that the Second Crusade altered Western attitudes to an extent to make the 1204 
sack of Constantinople more likely.  The belligerents had cast a greedy and malicious eye 
toward the Golden City well before Louis VII fled Attaleia in ignominy.  Innocent threatened 
excommunication against the errant crusaders because, regardless of any past Orthodox 
transgressions, Christian unity was more important.  His failure to deter the Fourth 
Crusade from Constantinople was a victory of greed and hatred over reason. 
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Roger II and the Sicilian raids 
While Manuel was busy preparing for the arrival of the armies of the Second 
Crusade, Roger II of Sicily took the opportunity to plunder the Aegean.  The coastal regions 
of the Balkans were never adequately defended against maritime raids, and Manuel’s 
removal of troops to guard the road into Constantinople left the coastal regions more 
vulnerable than ever.60  In the summer of 1147, Roger captured Corfu and raided Thebes 
and Corinth.  To add further insult, he abducted several of the wealthiest families from 
Corinth and Thebes and offered to return them for outrageous ransoms.  Choniates 
describes the severity of the situation:  
[Manuel] sought the counsel of every expert in military tactics and every popular 
orator whose words fell thicker than snowflakes.  Many proposals were made, but 
one plan appeared the best and was approved by the emperor: to wage war on the 
Sicilians on both land and sea, for the contest did not hold out high hopes or suggest 
brief encounters, but rather promised to be a mighty conflict like those which had 
exhausted the Roman emperors of old.61 
Choniates is exaggerating, but Roger’s attack exposed weaknesses in Manuel’s coastal 
defenses.  Furthermore, this was more than an opportunistic raid; Roger kept Corfu, which 
gave him control over the entrance of the Adriatic and a base from which to launch further 
raids in the Peloponnese.  After the crusader threat ended, Manuel planned a punitive 
expedition against Roger.  He completed his preparations in the spring of 1148.  The 
emperor could boast a large land force and a navy that included a strong Venetian 
presence.62  However, the war did not progress as planned. 
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Shortly after setting out from Constantinople, Manuel received word of a Cuman 
raid into the empire from across the Danube.  Barbarian raids from the north were among 
the most devastating events in Byzantine history.  While this raid may not have been quite 
as deadly as the Patzinak or Bulgar raids of past centuries, it had to be contained lest it 
bring harm to the most populous and productive parts of the empire – Thrace and 
Macedonia.  Manuel launched a dashing raid towards the Danube, where he shattered the 
Cuman force.  Angold states that this diversion of Byzantine forces from their original aim 
“achieved very little,” but it was exactly what the emperor needed.63   He quickly and 
efficiently secured his northern flank.  Manuel was now able to continue the march towards 
the Adriatic.  Unfortunately, his fleet did not join him until nearly the end of 1148, which 
prevented Manuel from crossing into Italy until the following year.  In the meantime, the 
emperor sent a force to recover Corfu and its citadel at Kekyra. 
The Byzantine timeline for the conquest of Sicily suffered a second blow when the 
Byzantine commander (doux) in charge of the siege of Kekyra was killed in battle.  Manuel 
was forced to personally take charge of this affair, which was already taking longer than he 
had hoped.  The emperor managed to subdue the citadel by starvation by the summer of 
1149 and even quelled a Venetian riot with diplomacy alone.  Although the Venetians 
greatly frustrated him, Manuel understood that operational prudence forbade him from 
taking any directly confrontational action.64  After the surrender of Kekyra, Manuel sent his 
naval force to Avlona (an Adriatic port in modern Albania sixty miles from Bari) to prepare 
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for the invasion of Italy.  Again, however, events in the north diverted his attention from 
Italy. 
The Balkan interlude 
In the summer of 1149, Manuel launched a punitive campaign against Serbia.  Many 
historians have questioned the wisdom of such a campaign when Manuel was clearly 
preoccupied with punishing Roger II of Sicily.  There are two reasons for his new 
campaigns.  First, Manuel stood more to lose in the Balkans if a challenge were left 
unanswered or, worse yet, if his enemies were able to successfully plunder the heartland of 
his empire.  Roger II of Sicily doubtless annoyed him greatly, but he was not able to 
seriously damage the empire.  Honor was satisfied when Manuel regained Corfu, and a 
subsequent Sicilian naval raiding force was obliterated when it attempted an attack on the 
suburbs of Constantinople.65  Second, Manuel could count on the Germans to act as a check 
to Sicily:  Roger had been able to attack Byzantine interests in the Aegean prior to the 
Second Crusade because the nature of the Byzantine-German alliance was still unclear.  At 
that time, Conrad’s attention had been towards the east.  He was not concerned with Italian 
affairs.  Thus, Roger’s northern flank was secure.  In 1149, Roger’s circumstances were 
vastly different.  Conrad and Manuel were allies, and Conrad had even pledged to support a 
campaign in southern Italy.  It was unlikely that Sicily would move against Byzantium again 
with a potential German threat on its northern border. 
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Choniates states that the Serbs were “unduly emboldened” by the emperor’s 
difficulties in Corfu and began to raid Byzantine lands.66  Kinnamos adds that the Serbs 
were allied with the Hungarians and the Germans, and that even the Turks under Yaghi-
Basan joined with Ikonion to raid Anatolia.67  This is likely an exaggeration, but it appears 
that the Serb župan was indeed supported by the Hungarians.68  The emperor achieved a 
number of victories against the Serbs and subdued every major fort under the župan’s 
control.  The main Serb force, however, withdrew into the mountain passes where Manuel 
was unable to dislodge it. 
The 1140s in summary 
When Manuel returned to Constantinople on Christmas Day in 1149, he received a 
glorious welcome from the city.  The hero emperor was rewarded with lofty praise from 
the senate and the populace and was entertained by horse races and other spectacles.69  
The accolades were well deserved.  He quelled every serious challenge to his authority.  
One of his most serious crises was the arrival of Conrad and Louis, who aspired to gain 
power in Outremer at Manuel’s expense.  Their arrogance and their ignorance of Anatolian 
power relations caused them to self-destruct, saving Manuel the awkwardness of having to 
use force against them.  Also, Manuel found an opportunity in Conrad’s misfortune.  The 
exhausted German monarch acquiesced to Byzantine claims toward southern Italy and 
promised to fight against Roger of Sicily. 
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Manuel’s activity during this period can be described as containment actions.  The 
Seljuks of Rûm began harassing Byzantine interests in Anatolia immediately after the death 
of John II in 1143.  Manuel responded with a dashing campaign that was designed to 
impress both his new wife and Western onlookers.  He wanted to be seen as an active 
combatant in the holy war against the barbarians and Christianity’s finest general.  
Although he had to withdraw from Ikonion because of rumors of the coming crusade and 
Sicilian attacks in the Aegean, the expedition served its purpose, nonetheless.  In a letter 
written to the pope, Manuel referred to his current campaign against the Seljuks and 
welcomed the coming crusade as reinforcements in the battle.70 
The Norman invasion from Sicily was more serious because imperial lands were 
taken.  Also, it fanned the flames of hatred between the Komneni and the Normans, who 
had been at odds for over a century.  The emperor personally led the siege to retake the 
citadel of Kekyra at Corfu and also led two punitive campaigns into the Balkans to secure 
his northern border.   
Manuel’s perceptive strategy enhanced the Byzantine position in Outremer, 
especially Syria.  He also demonstrated to his enemies that he was just as capable, if not 
more so, than his father.  Manuel secured the throne in an empire where succession was 
not always guaranteed and was extremely dangerous. Finally, he maintained progress in 
recovering the prestige as well as political and military power lost after Manzikert seven 
decades earlier. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ITALIAN ADVENTURE 
Compared to the 1140s, the 1150s were a difficult decade for Manuel’s imperial strategy.  
His primary goal was to punish Roger II and to regain the former Byzantine possessions 
that Roger’s ancestors had captured in southern Italy during the eleventh century.  If 
Conrad were to fulfill his promise to join such a campaign, success would seem assured.  
His efforts to reduce Sicily, however, were frustrated by the need to quell Hungarian unrest 
four times before 1156.  Moreover, the political landscape of the Byzantine sphere of 
influence changed considerably.  In 1152, Conrad died and was succeeded by Frederick 
Barbarossa (1152-90); the ascension of Barbarossa marks a period of steady deterioration 
in German-Byzantine relations.  Then, in 1154, Manuel’s arch-nemesis, Roger II, died and 
was succeeded by his son William I (1154-66).  By 1155, the situation on the Byzantine 
western flank was secure enough to invade Italy.  This campaign did not achieve its original 
goal, but Manuel displayed a remarkable ability to adapt to changing circumstances and 
was able to make the most of a less than ideal situation. 
 Manuel was aware that fighting protracted conflicts on two fronts was beyond the 
capability of his empire.  Because of this, he was forced to accept temporary setbacks in the 
east while he was occupied in Italy.  He attempted to contain the ambitions of the lords of  
Cilicia and Antioch through diplomacy but was unsuccessful.  Once matters were settled in 
Italy in 1158, the emperor devoted his full attention to the east and achieved great success.  
Antioch was brought to heel permanently in 1159, and Manuel extended his influence into 
the kingdom of Jerusalem.  His relations with the Seljuks of Rûm continued to warm and he 
was even able to call on the sultan for assistance, albeit with only moderate success.  Cilicia 
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proved difficult to control permanently because of the dogged persistence and bellicose 
nature of the Armenians.   
Hungary vies for power in the Balkans 
The 1150s began with alarming news from the north.  The Hungarians were attempting to 
spread their influence throughout the Balkans, but especially along the Dalmatian coast.71  
The Hungarian king, Géza II (1141-62), directly challenged Manuel’s authority in the region 
by supporting Serb resistance.  This was further troubling, as it appears to have been a 
scheme by Roger II to force Manuel into a two-front war.72  Roger was certain Manuel 
would not dare to cross the Adriatic as long as his northern flank was not secure.  Thus, he 
conspired with Géza to ensure Manuel’s preoccupation in the north.   
Manuel undertook an offensive against Hungary and Serbia in 1150.  He succeeded 
in bringing Župan Uros II (1145-62) into submission and even received from him a 
contribution of two thousand soldiers for future military service.73  Manuel also defeated 
the Hungarians, but they continued to resist.  In the subsequent campaign next year, 
Manuel severely defeated Géza and brought him to terms.74  The Hungarians were 
quiescent for the next few years until they were inspired to treachery by Manuel’s cousin, 
Andronicus, who promised to hand over the fortresses of Belgrade and Braničevo.75   
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Manuel discovered the plot sufficiently in advance to prepare for the attack, but the 
Hungarians would not be deterred.  The invasion of 1155 was the most ambitious project 
the Hungarians ever dared.  Géza conspired to break the Byzantine influence far to the 
north in Kiev and use his soon-to-be acquired fortresses on the Danube to raid Macedonia.    
Furious at the Hungarians’ faithlessness, Manuel shattered the invasion force and followed 
this victory with another campaign in 1156, after which Géza accepted client status.  The 
death of Roger in 1154, combined with the failure of their grand scheme to take the most 
important cities along the Danube in 1155, was enough to quell further Hungarian hostility.   
 Some of Manuel’s critics claim that the fact that he had to fight the Hungarians in 
four campaigns between 1150 and 1155 demonstrates weakness in his strategy and 
command.  To the contrary, it reveals his awareness of his strategic challenges.   Manuel 
envisioned a rather quick victory against Sicily once the Germans entered the fray as 
Conrad promised in 1148.  Thus, he needed to keep the bulk of his force prepared for a 
rapid deployment across the Adriatic.  Any action in the north, by necessity, was limited to 
breaking Hungarian aggression to prevent the possibility of a two-front war while engaged 
with Roger. 
The death of Emperor Conrad in 1152 threatened the plan for a joint offensive 
against Sicily.  His successor, Frederick Barbarossa, was one of Conrad’s most outspoken 
commanders in asserting his anti-Byzantine sentiment.  Manuel, however, demonstrated 
his recognition of the need to maintain a strategic alliance with Germany by cultivating 
good relations with Frederick, who never broke definitively with Manuel.  Fortunately, the 
death of Roger in 1154 removed the threat of a two-front war, as his successor William 
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chose not to become involved in Balkan affairs.  Finally, Manuel was able to turn his 
attention towards Italy. 
Italy, Germany, and Byzantium 
The war against Sicily did not wait for Manuel to quell the conflicts in the Balkans.  
Byzantine and Sicilian navies fought each other with minor successes on both sides.76  The 
imperial navy was trounced in 1154, but maritime victories were ultimately irrelevant 
unless they were followed by successes on land, which the Normans were unable to 
accomplish.77  Roger’s death presented a grand opportunity, and the emperor could not 
allow it to pass.  However, he had to act very carefully lest he insult the honor of the 
Germans.  Frederick was obliged to fulfill the oath made by Conrad of conducting an 
offensive against Sicily’s possessions in southern Italy.  Additionally, Conrad promised 
southern Italy to Constantinople during the marriage negotiations between Manuel and 
Bertha Sulzbach.  A unilateral attack on Sicily by Byzantium would insult German pride by 
not allowing them sufficient time to fulfill their oath.   
Manuel appears to have been successful in drawing Frederick Barbarossa into the 
field in 1154.   Barbarossa invaded Lombardy with the intention of driving further south to 
punish Sicily.  The Germans quickly subdued the major cities of northern Italy before 
proceeding to Rome, where Pope Adrian IV (1154-59) crowned Frederick the Holy Roman 
Emperor.  Frederick left Rome in the summer of 1155, but disease and deprivation halted 
his advance against Sicily.78  Byzantine officials arrived in Italy in time to see the German 
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army head north.  It was not until Manuel was convinced that Germany was no longer 
interested in Italy that his forces crossed the Adriatic and began to plan an offensive.   
 The Byzantines were largely successful in their first forays into Italy.  Manuel sent 
Michael Palaiologos and John Doukas, two of his highest ranking nobles (sebastoi) with 
large sums of money, originally intended to convince Barbarossa to renew his offensive 
against Sicily.  The German emperor, however, was obliged to tend to affairs in his court, 
which were quickly deteriorating.  Barbarossa was more interested in quelling the 
internecine civil wars within his empire than dealing with Sicily.79  After they were 
rebuffed by the Germans, Palaiologos and Doukas were introduced to a disaffected nephew 
of the late Roger II, Robert of Bassonville.  Bassonville, apparently, already had motives to 
revolt against William, so Byzantine money made him all the more willing. 80  Almost 
immediately afterwards, Palaiologos hired a sizable force of mercenaries, including 
Venetian lancers.81  He was able to acquire the town of Viesti by treaty while Doukas 
reduced a well-defended fortress, prompting the city of Flaviano to surrender.  At the 
beginning of 1156, the Byzantines captured Bari and could claim control of the entire 
Apulia region. 
 The forces of Palaiologos and Doukas continued to win over towns and forts to their 
cause and soundly defeated a relief force under William of Sicily’s chancellor.  However, 
Byzantine fortunes changed after Palaiologos died in the spring, leaving Doukas in sole 
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command.82  Doukas continued the fight against William but was captured, along with 
reinforcements under Alexios Komnenos, in a defeat at Brindisi.  Kinnamos clearly blames 
Doukas and Komnenos: 
To this end the folly of Komnenos and Doukas brought their earlier renown.  So 
present-day men are: some survive entirely bereft of military science and bring 
affairs to ruin, others perchance know a part of military science but are wrong about 
the more important part.  For strategy is an art, and one who practices it must be 
supple and cunning and know how to make a timely alteration at every turn of it.  
For there is a time when it is not shameful to flee, if occasion follows, and again to 
pursue relentlessly, each according to one’s advantage; where success would seem 
more by cunning than by force, risking everything is to be deprecated.83 
His analysis is remarkably perceptive.  The evidence is clear that the Byzantines continued 
the siege of Brindisi even while a very large Norman force was on its way.84  The emperor, 
however, was quick to respond to this unfortunate turn of events.  He dispatched Alexios 
Axouchos to Italy with enough money to raise another mercenary force, this time based 
further to the north in Ancona as a check to growing Venetian power and influence.85 
The conflict against Sicily came to an abrupt end in the spring of 1158 when Manuel 
and William declared peace.  Kinnamos states that Axouchos came close to bringing the 
entirety of Italy under Byzantine sway, but Doukas and Komnenos, while in captivity, made 
promises to William that they were not authorized to make – forcing Manuel to accept 
peace when he was prepared to continue the fight.86  This is highly unlikely, as Manuel 
would have been in no way obliged to accept any treaty negotiated by the captive 
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Byzantine commanders.  In this instance, Choniates provides a better understanding of the 
situation:   
Alexios [Axouchos], an energetic man expert in military science, with a tongue sharp 
as his mind and dignified in appearance, put his hands to the task of realizing the 
emperor’s stratagems upon his arrival.  He immediately set about to enlist troops so 
as to shake the king’s resolve with such news; he collected a large cavalry force to 
give the impression he was preparing to invade Calabria.87   
Axouchos’s mission was to ensure the best possible terms from William, and he 
accomplished this by bluffing a second invasion.  But why would the Byzantines settle for 
peace now?  The defeat at Brindisi was indeed an embarrassment, but it was not decisive.  
The bulk of the casualties were mercenaries that Axouchos had no difficulty in replacing.  
And why would William agree to peace after the Byzantines inspired almost all of southern 
Italy to rise up against him?  To answer this, it is necessary to examine developments in the 
rest of the empire.  
 The relationship between Manuel and Barbarossa did not break with the Byzantine 
invasion of Apulia in 1155, as historians have suggested.  Frederick was likely concerned 
with the breadth of Manuel’s initial success, but there is little evidence of hostility.  If 
Barbarossa was hostile to the Byzantine presence in Italy, it is doubtful that Palaiologos 
and Doukas would have initiated military operations.88 In 1156, the German emperor did 
break off negotiations to marry Manuel’s niece, Maria, but this was not because of any ill 
will towards Manuel – it was a necessary power move in the internal politics of the empire.  
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Barbarossa married Beatrice of Burgundy to obtain her vast inheritance.  Manuel was 
nonetheless disappointed, but not alienated. 89   
The issue that made good relations impossible between the two emperors was that 
both Manuel and Barbarossa considered themselves to be the emperors of Rome.  While 
this appears minor, it was enough to make Manuel uneasy about the German alliance.  After 
Barbarossa’s coronation as the Holy Roman Empire in 1155, he increasingly saw himself as 
the successor to Constantine the Great and began to interfere in traditionally Byzantine 
spheres of influence.  Barbarossa would address Manuel as the king of the Greeks, which 
doubtless bruised the imperial ego.90  Barbarossa also began to foster a relationship with 
the Hungarian kingdom.  He began to express displeasure with any Byzantine influence in 
northern Italy and made that fact clear to Axouchos when he moved against Axouchos at 
Ancona, located midway on the Italian Adriatic coast, in 1158. 91   He was unsuccessful 
because Axouchos was firmly entrenched and enjoyed near universal support there, but the 
damage was done.  Germany was becoming too powerful for Manuel’s comfort. It is 
symbolic that Manuel’s German wife, Bertha-Eirene, died at the end of 1159 – now there 
were no longer any formal ties between Byzantium and Germany. 
  After the death of Pope Adrian IV in 1159, Barbarossa intervened in the disputed 
papal elections, which prompted a schism that lasted nearly two decades.  Although the 
Byzantine emperors had lost the right to nominate the successor to the throne of Saint 
Peter centuries earlier, for a German emperor to do so was a tremendous insult to imperial 
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honor.92  It was the papal schism that gave Manuel the pretext to move against Germany.  
Barbarossa placed Victor IV in Rome, while nearly all of Christendom supported the claim 
of Alexander III.  Manuel chose to back Alexander.  This policy would define his relations 
with the west for the rest of his life.   Peace with William of Sicily was necessary for both 
Sicily and Byzantium to curb the growing influence of Barbarossa.  Additionally, matters in 
the east required Manuel’s personal and undivided attention.   
Before moving on, it is important to note that the peace with Sicily in 1158 was a 
dramatic realignment of Byzantine relations.93  For decades, opposition to the Normans 
had been a staple of Komneni dealings in the west.  Making peace with them was not a 
move Manuel made lightly, and he would not have made it unless he expected some sort of 
benefit.  The year 1158 also marks a change in imperial strategy.  It would have been nearly 
impossible for the Byzantines to directly occupy all of southern Italy.  It was also useless for 
Manuel to capture town after town in Italy, or anywhere else on the frontier as his enemies 
would simply retake them after the army disbanded or departed.  Thus, the emperor 
conspired to defeat his enemies by surrounding himself with friends.  This policy typically 
cost considerably less than war did and did not entail the dangers of overexposing his 
forces.  Friendship with Sicily gave Manuel security in the Aegean and an ally to use against 
Barbarossa.  A successful alliance with Sicily, and later the crusader states, brought the 
empire most of the benefits of control without the dangers.  
One of Manuel’s most important diplomatic victories was the acquisition of Genoa as 
an ally.  In 1155, a Byzantine agent secured an agreement with the city, which extended 
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trade rights to Genoese interests in the empire and gave Manuel another significant base of 
operations.94  However, the alliance was not without difficulty.  Genoa lay in a precarious 
situation.  As a burgeoning power, it was unable to adequately defend against its rivals, 
specifically Venice and Pisa.  Additionally, Genoa faced danger from the Normans of Sicily 
and the German empire.  It is not surprising that both Pisa and Genoa refused to sign 
definitively with Byzantium for fear of retribution.  Italian relations at this juncture were, at 
best, complicated.  Genoa and Pisa were allied and indeed vassals of Byzantium.  However, 
the two maritime trading powers chose to remain neutral in the conflict between Germany 
and Byzantium.95   
The situation became further convoluted as Germany sought to extend its influence 
into northern Italy.  The maritime republics banded together to resist Germany, yet 
remained unwilling to commit to Byzantium in a military alliance for fear of upsetting the 
German emperor.  While it may appear that Manuel simply failed to provide ample 
encouragement to bring Genoa and Pisa into a solid alliance, such an alliance was unlikely.  
The two city states were quite vulnerable and could not afford to break definitively with 
the Germans, even as they were fighting Barbarossa to maintain their independence.  
Manuel had to settle for a less-than-perfect relationship with the Italian maritime states.  
They were loyal to Byzantium, especially Genoa, and acted as an effective balance against 
Venetian power.  The benefits of this arrangement allowed Manuel to break with Venice 
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during the 1160s and 1170s.  They could not, however, risk fighting alongside Manuel 
against Sicily for fear of upsetting Barbarossa.96 
Frustration in the east 
Byzantium was in an advantageous position in the aftermath of the Second Crusade.  It was 
obvious that Manuel was the only viable candidate to be a benefactor for the crusader 
states, and he capitalized on this.  Rather than taking a confrontational stance with the 
Franks as his father did, Manuel took great pains to display his magnanimity.  In 1150, 
Manuel purchased the remnants of the county of Edessa from the wife of the captive 
Joscelin II.   It is unlikely that Manuel seriously believed he could hold Edessa from Zengi’s 
successor, Nur ad-Din (1146-74).  In fact, the area was lost to him within a year.97  
However, the act further enhanced his legal claim to the region and demonstrated a general 
concern for the welfare of the Frankish states.98   
Manuel’s next diplomatic move was an attempt to acquire Antioch by marriage.  
Raymond of Antioch had met his end in 1149 in battle against Zengi, leaving his widow 
Constance to care for the city and his child heir, Bohemond.  The emperor dispatched John 
Roger to seek the hand of Constance.  He was an ideal choice because he was a high-ranking 
official in the government, and his Norman lineage would make him appear less foreign 
than a Greek suitor.99  Unfortunately, he was rebuffed by Constance because of his age.100  
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However, the proposal was certainly worth the attempt.  A successful marriage would 
essentially be a Byzantine annexation of Antioch. 
The situation in Byzantine Cilicia deteriorated rapidly after the Second Crusade, 
prompting the emperor to send his wildly unreliable cousin, Andronicus, to assume 
command.  An Armenian named Thoros (1145-69) had managed to capture nearly every 
major town in Cilicia.101  Kinnamos states that Andronicus seriously mismanaged the 
campaign: “And he would have speedily accomplished something noble and have gotten the 
rebel into his hands with great ease, except that he devoted himself to indolence and sports 
in his tent, and thus the Romans’ affairs collapsed.”102  Andronicus was relieved of 
command after his defeat at the hands of Thoros.  Afterwards, Manuel inexplicably gave 
him a command in the Balkans, providing him with the opportunity to perpetrate treachery 
at a later date.103 
Manuel still thought that diplomacy could contain the situation.  In 1153, he 
convinced the sultan of Rûm to attack Thoros.  But Masud merely subdued him and did not 
obtain the release of Byzantine lands as Manuel had requested.  The emperor made a 
similar overture to the new lord of Antioch, Reynald de Châtillon (1153-60), who attacked 
Thoros but, again, did not gain the release of the territories the emperor requested.  In 
1156, Reynald betrayed Manuel by allying with Thoros and conducting a devastating raid 
on Cyprus.104  Manuel was furious.  His policy of containment in the east had failed.  After 
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the emperor concluded the Italian campaign, he sought to exact his vengeance upon both 
Thoros and Reynald. 
Manuel gathered a large army and marched through Anatolia.  He stopped briefly to 
attack the Turks to ensure they would not intervene.  The emperor kept the movements of 
his army a secret, and Thoros and Reynald assumed that the emperor was conducting a 
protracted campaign against Ikonion – until Manuel appeared in Cilicia.105  The emperor 
successfully captured Byzantine Cilicia in a short period.  The presence of such a vast host 
attracted emissaries from all the crusader states and even from Nur ad-Din.106  Both 
Reynald and Thoros made pitiable displays of penance and were forgiven by the emperor.   
The emperor was, however, able to solidify his relationship with Jerusalem through 
marriage.  The king of Jerusalem had two problems in the mid-1150s – he was 
exceptionally broke and did not have a wife to give him an heir.  After lengthy discussions, 
Baldwin sent an envoy to Constantinople to ask for the hand of a Komneni daughter.107  
Manuel was happy to oblige.  He sent his niece Theodora to Jerusalem along with an 
extravagant dowry and enough funds to pay for the celebrations.108  The details of their 
alliance were not made public, but Baldwin probably promised to support Manuel in his 
effort to bring Reynald and Thoros to heel in exchange for Manuel not exerting direct 
control over Antioch.  The treaty also ensured that the crusaders now had an ally to watch 
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over them.  Such security was desperately needed in light of the continued success of Nur 
ad-Din, who was ruler over Aleppo and Damascus. 
It is in Manuel’s dealings with Cilicia and Antioch that it is possible to see a new 
phase of Byzantine imperial strategy.  His experiences in Italy had taught the emperor that 
direct control of contested areas of the frontier was difficult to maintain.  Instead, Manuel 
sought to exert his influence through feudal dominion.  This policy would be especially 
helpful in his dealings in the West because he would be seen as the protector of Christian 
interests.  The prestige of receiving homage from other nations would be helpful in 
countering the influence of the German emperor and would also impress the Byzantine-
supported claimant to the papacy.  Thus, Manuel not only forgave the two obstinate figures 
but allowed them to keep their territories.  Antioch became a Byzantine fief.  Reynald was 
obliged to provide military support at Manuel’s will and install an Orthodox patriarch.  
Manuel relieved Thoros of the Cilician plain but allowed him to keep the mountain passes 
and recognized him as ruler of Armenia.109  
The emperor spent the winter in Cilicia improving his defenses in the area lest 
Thoros forget his oaths.  Early in 1159, Manuel made a triumphal procession through 
Antioch.  Kinnamos details the splendor: 
Then there met him the holy bishop of the city garbed in a priestly robe, with the 
whole order of priests.  They held in their hands crosses, and bore the Holy 
Scriptures, so that the entire foreign and outland [populace] was astonished, 
observing in addition to these things Reynald and the notables of Antioch running 
on foot around the imperial horse, and Baldwin, a crowned  man, parading a long 
way behind on horseback, but without insignia.  The Antiochenes exhibited so much 
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servility to him that, while he dwelt at Raynald’s palace, none of those who had 
disputes had the case judged by compatriots, but by Romans.110   
This spectacle was meant to impress all of Outremer – and it worked.  Manuel spent the 
next few days with elegant festivities, rich banquets, and a tournament where he dazzled 
onlookers with personal displays of martial prowess. This was a demonstration of the 
power and wealth of the empire as well as a stunt to put Antiochene fears of a Byzantine 
takeover to rest.   
Afterwards, Manuel and his crusader allies sallied against Nur ad-Din.  However, 
before the expedition came to blows, an envoy of Nur ad-Din arrived, promising to release 
thousands of captives from the Second Crusade, including numerous notable persons. The 
emperor was satisfied with the arrangement and returned to Constantinople.  He had 
demonstrated the might of the empire and achieved a humanitarian victory in the release 
of so many Christians.  Nur ad-Din also promised to assist Byzantine interests in Anatolia 
against Ikonion. 111    
There are hints in the sources that other factors were in play to encourage Manuel 
to end his stay in Outremer and return to his capital.  Kinnamos states that the emperor 
considered breaking the treaty with Nur ad-Din and attacking Aleppo, but that “some 
rumors from the west, which reported that matters were in an uproar there, hindered him 
from the undertaking.”112  It is unknown what “uproar” Kinnamos is referring to, but in 
light of Byzantine history, there certainly may well have been a conspiracy against Manuel 
in the capital.  Manuel does seem to have been in a hurry to get back to Constantinople: he 
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failed to inform the Seljuks that he would pass through their territory, thereby provoking 
an unnecessary fight that led to casualties among his troops.  Whether or not the attack on 
Aleppo was actually planned and then abandoned, Lilie points out that leaving Nur ad-Din 
in place served Manuel’s interests better: 
He knew very well that Byzantine influence in the crusader states could be 
maintained only if those states were under heavy pressure from outside.  It was 
once more demonstrated that Frankish and Byzantine interests could not be the 
same.  Why should Manuel put his army at risk by attacking Aleppo, possibly in 
vain?  That would have been in the interest of the Franks but would have done 
nothing for Byzantium, rather the contrary.113 
Manuel’s treatment towards Ikonion is curious.  He assembled one of the largest 
Byzantine armies to ever march into Anatolia, yet he chose not to use that army against the 
Seljuks.  Why?  A likely explanation for his disinterest is that the death of Masud I in 1156 
changed the Seljuk political landscape.  Turkish Asia Minor was no longer united under a 
single leader.  Manuel believed he could take advantage of this fact diplomatically.  If he 
played the various Seljuks potentates against each other, their power would diminish.  
Manuel would then be in a substantially more advantageous position to strike against 
Ikonion.  This strategy of divide and conquer increases the value of Nur ad Din’s pledge to 
support Byzantium against Ikonion.  The Seljuks were surrounded by hostile powers and 
were obliged to seek favor with Manuel.  Twenty years later, Manuel may have wished that 
he had destroyed Ikonion.  However, at this juncture, Manuel believed that Ikonion could 
be contained with a mixture of diplomacy and force.  This was less dangerous and less 
expensive than a fight to the death.  The unannounced march of Byzantine forces through 
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Seljuk territory was reckless; however, it gave Manuel the pretext to act against Ikonion 
later. 
The 1150s in summary 
Towards the end of 1159, Manuel was able to rest comfortably in his capital.  He had 
met his objectives both in the west and east.  In the west, Manuel began the decade with the 
prospect of a massive expedition against the Normans of Sicily.  The wily Roger II, however, 
ensured that the Byzantines were distracted in the Balkans for some time.  Ironically, the 
delay was fortunate for Manuel, as it gave the Germans ample time to fulfill the oath Conrad 
made in 1148 in the aftermath of the Second Crusade.  It was fortuitous that the final 
subjugation of the Hungarians and Serbs in 1155 coincided with an abortive attempt by 
Conrad’s successor, Frederick Barbarossa, to punish Sicily.  Manuel was free to move 
against the Normans, now under William I, without insulting German honor.   
The Byzantine campaign in Italy met with great success initially, but after the failure 
at Brindisi in 1156, Manuel largely abandoned his plans for direct control on the frontiers 
of the empire.  The emperor felt that Byzantine interests were best served by surrounding 
the empire with a ring of friendly client states.  The friendship formed with Sicily lasted 
over a decade and served as a formidable counterweight to German influence.  The Serbs 
and Hungarians were silent after accepting client status in 1156 and even supplied soldiers 
for Manuel’s march to Cilicia in 1158.  Only the death of Géza II in the next decade 
prompted the end of this satisfactory arrangement. 
Affairs in the east vexed the emperor while he was campaigning in Italy.  However, 
he could not directly intervene because he was well aware that fighting a protracted 
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conflict on two fronts was beyond the resources of his empire.  Indeed, the apparent 
rumors of conspiracy in Constantinople in 1159 demonstrate the danger of the emperor’s 
campaigning so far away from the capital.  Once he concluded the Italian expedition, he was 
able to put things in order rather quickly.  With relatively little effort, he established a 
friendly and lasting relationship with Antioch and Jerusalem.  He even developed a 
respectful relationship with Aleppo that would have been productive for the crusader 
states had Baldwin not attacked Nur ad-Din almost immediately after Manuel’s 
withdrawal.114  The story of crusaders sabotaging the diplomatic successes of the emperor 
would be a feature of the rest of Manuel’s reign.  The only area of Byzantine influence that 
was left unsettled was in Ikonion, and this was largely the emperor’s doing by rushing 
through Seljuk lands. 
The difficulty with Byzantium not exerting direct control over the frontier regions is 
best illustrated by the summation of the Italian campaign by Choniates: “Such was the 
outcome of Emperor Manuel’s struggles in Sicily and Calabria that the lavish and huge sums 
of money poured into them served no useful purpose to the Romans, nor did they bring 
lasting benefits to succeeding emperors.”115  The benefits of an ally in Sicily as a counter to 
German power are difficult to accept as a suitable reward for the cost, as it produced no 
tangible effects.  However, Manuel’s policies were extremely perceptive in that he realized 
the limitations of his empire and how to maximize his influence with minimal risk.  He 
understood that conquest invited only further troubles, and the empire already had enough 
of those. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE APOGEE OF THE KOMNENI REVIVAL 
During the 1160s, Byzantium became stronger than it had been in over a century.  The 
empire was insulated by a ring of mostly friendly client states, and the emperor was secure 
in the capital.  In the east, Manuel continued to foster cordial relations amongst the 
crusaders and even cemented his claim to Antioch through a politically savvy marriage.  In 
1164, Nur ad-Din trounced the crusaders at the battle of Harim.  Manuel dispatched a large 
force to deter him from taking Antioch.  During Manuel’s Anatolian campaigns, he was able 
to call upon Antioch and Armenia to supply auxiliaries that were quite helpful against the 
Seljuks.  After he defeated the Seljuks, they accepted client status and remained on good 
terms with Constantinople although they never quite fulfilled their part of the alliance.  
 In the west, Manuel was obliged to campaign in the Balkans a number of times.  In 
1165, the situation was especially dangerous, as the Hungarians allied with Serbia, 
Germany, and the Russian principalities of Kiev and Gallich.  However, Manuel 
systematically stripped Hungary of its allies and then destroyed its army.  Hungary was 
broken and would never raise the sword against Manuel again.  Indeed, after 1167 Hungary 
proved to be a most faithful ally.   
 Manuel engaged in his most ambitious foray with the Papacy.  By 1167, there was a 
real possibility that the schism between Rome and Constantinople would come to an end 
and the pope would recognize the authority of a sole Roman emperor – Manuel.  All his 
efforts in Italy were to ensure that this dream would become a reality. 
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Entente with Ikonion 
The indefatigable Masud I died in 1156.  He divided his empire among his son, Kiliҫ Arslan 
II (1156-92), and two of his sons-in-law, Yaghi-Basan and Dhū’l Nūn.  Arslan, naturally, 
received the lion’s share of the territory which included the capital at Ikonion.116  Manuel 
watched with satisfaction as the three heirs of Masud fought over their inheritances.  The 
emperor sent letters to both Arslan and the stronger of the other two, Yaghi-Basan, and 
encouraged both of them to continue the fight and promised the support of the empire.  
Manuel was on good terms with both men until Arslan and Manuel came to blows after the 
latter’s speedy withdrawal from northern Syria. 
 Late in 1159, the emperor prepared for a large assault on the Seljuks as well as the 
bands of marauding Turks that were becoming a serious nuisance to the Byzantines and 
the Seljuks alike.117  He ordered his governors in Asia to prepare for coordinated assaults 
along the frontier.  Early in 1160, and again in 1161, Manuel personally led his forces to 
victory against the Seljuks.  He rejected pleas from Seljuk ambassadors for peace and 
continued to raid Cappadocia and Bithynia (central and north-central Anatolia).  The coup 
de grace came in 1161.  Manuel gathered a sizable army that included auxiliaries from 
Serbia, Antioch and, Armenia.  Additionally, he incited Yaghi-Basan and Arslan’s brother, 
Shāhan-Shāh, to make war-like gestures to incite the fear in the sultan that his eastern flank 
was vulnerable.118  Arslan immediately made peace overtures, but Manuel did not respond.  
The Byzantine position in Anatolia was further strengthened when the Byzantine army of 
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Cilicia, combined with the crusader auxiliaries from Antioch, was surprised by a large 
Seljuk force.  In spite of the Seljuks’ tactical advantage, the Turks were soundly defeated.  
Arslan begged Manuel for mercy and promised to be a most faithful vassal.  The emperor 
accepted the terms and departed.119 
 The next spring, Arslan made a personal appearance in Constantinople to request 
the emperor’s assistance against Yaghi-Basan.  Both Kinnamos and Choniates describe 
amazing scenes of opulence whilst the emperor entertained Arslan.120  The reduction of the 
Seljuks was an amazing opportunity, and the emperor was to make the most of it.  
Kinnamos notes that Arslan was chronically short of funds, and thus the demonstration 
was meant to show Arslan the benefits associated with friendship with the empire.121  
Choniates aptly describes the emperor’s intentions:  
Receiving him graciously, the emperor heaped honors upon him so that he was 
gladdened at the lavishness of the hospitality.  Manuel had high hopes of 
satisfactorily disposing of the issues in the East, thanks to the sultan’s presence, and 
of charming the money-loving barbarian with gratifying entertainment, but he also 
believed that this circumstance would bring glory to the empire.122 
Choniates continues by stating that Arslan immediately violated the terms of the 
alliance.  Arslan had agreed to return and capture to Manuel the town of Sebasteia, a former 
Byzantine possession, from Yaghi-Basan.  Arslan captured it, but kept it rather than turning 
it over to Manuel.  Even this brazen act did not break the new relationship established by 
Manuel and Arslan.  Choniates states that the sultan conducted a number of raids against 
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Byzantine lands after Arslan accepted client status.  This claim is misleading, because the 
raids were conducted by nomadic bands of Turks that the sultan could not control.  In fact, 
the marauders attacked the Seljuks as well.  At best, the raiders could be contained.  The 
emperor accomplished this by fortifying the frontier zones.123  After Arslan departed 
Constantinople in 1162, the rulers maintained an exceptionally warm relationship.  In fact, 
Manuel adopted Arslan as his own son, and the sultan addressed Manuel as father.  This 
does not mean that relations between the two men were not strained, but the cozy 
relationship would have soured abruptly if Manuel had felt betrayed.   
Arslan was not yet in a position to act in a directly hostile manner towards Manuel.  
Yaghi-Basan died in 1165 and the sultan was able to capitalize on this quickly: he annexed 
his domains and then stripped Dhū’l Nūn of his lands in 1168.  Later, he exiled Shāhan-
Shāh.124  However, Arslan still faced a strong Byzantine presence to his west and south.  
The crusaders were firmly allied with Byzantium and could threaten him from the south-
east.  Perhaps most dangerous of all, Nur ad-Din dominated his eastern frontier and was 
quite hostile.  In fact, the exiled Dhū’l Nūn and Shāhan-Shāh alternated between the courts 
of Manuel and Nur ad-Din, seeking support.125 
For many historians, Manuel made a grievous strategic error in not quashing the 
power of Kiliҫ Arslan.  The emperor, however, was not in a condition to do that for several 
reasons.  First, Balkan affairs after 1164 required Manuel’s immediate attention.  
Byzantium remained incapable of fighting two extended conflicts simultaneously, so the 
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emperor had to be content with Arslan’s oath of friendship.  Finally, Manuel, at this 
juncture, knew that Arslan could not act against him because he was completely 
surrounded by hostile nations allied to Constantinople.  If Manuel pressed his gains against 
Arslan, then he would have risked destabilizing the Anatolian frontier when he was needed 
elsewhere.  Choniates condemns the peace between Ikonion and Constantinople from the 
safety of hindsight. 
The lord of Outremer 
The Byzantine position in the crusader states was exceptionally strong.  As Lilie states, “In 
Asia Minor the Empire had become the dominant power; in Syria the Emperor’s will was 
law.”126  Manuel succeeded in strengthening his position everywhere except in Cilicia, 
where the Armenians successfully challenged Byzantine rule.  By 1167, Manuel was in a 
position to dream of a large-scale coordinated effort with the crusader states. 
 One of Manuel’s first acts was to find a new bride to replace Bertha-Eirene.  Initially, 
the emperor left the decision to Baldwin of Jerusalem, who suggested Melisende of 
Tripoli.127  However, circumstances provided Manuel with a unique opportunity.  Nur ad-
Din’s forces captured Reynald of Antioch, leaving the city without a ruler.  Manuel found it 
more advantageous to marry the princess of a city without a ruler rather than a sister to a 
living count.128  Baldwin and Raymond II of Tripoli were upset, but there was little they 
could do.129  Manuel married the beautiful Maria of Antioch in December of 1161, thereby 
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increasing his influence over Antioch.  Manuel did not bother to ransom Reynald from Nur 
ad-Din, leaving him to suffer for seventeen years in captivity.  Maria’s mother, Constance 
ruled Antioch as regent. 130 
 In Cilicia, the news was not so pleasant.  Since 1158, Manuel had allowed the 
Armenian prince Thoros II limited powers in Cilicia while sovereignty belonged to the 
Byzantine governor.  In 1163, however, the governor treacherously murdered Thoros’s 
brother Stephen.  Thoros and his younger brother Mleh took swift and terrible vengeance 
on the Byzantine garrisons and towns of Cilicia.131  The crisis was contained when the new 
king of Jerusalem, Amalric, intervened.  Manuel removed the governor and replaced him 
with Constantine Kalamanos with the goal of soothing Armenian rage.132  His work was cut 
short by a major invasion of northern Syria by Nur ad-Din.  
 In April of 1164, Nur ad-Din besieged the great fortress of Harim, on the route 
between Antioch and Aleppo.  Kalamanos managed to persuade Thoros and Mleh to join 
the Byzantine army against their common foe.  They linked up with the crusader forces and 
broke the siege.  However, the coalition’s forces lost their discipline and chased after Nur 
ad-Din’s army.  The Zengids then counter-attacked, slaughtering large numbers of the allied 
troops.  Many of the nobles, including Kalamanos, Raymond of Tripoli, and Bohemond of 
Antioch were captured.  Antioch was in serious danger, and only the timely intercession of 
the emperor’s army saved the city.  Additionally, Manuel secured the release of Kalamanos 
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and Bohemond from captivity. 133  Manuel dispatched a large army to Antioch and evicted 
Nur ad-Din from western Syria.134 
 The battle of Harim was a disaster.  Outremer lost a significant number of knights 
and fighting men – exacerbating a shortage of manpower.  Ibn al-Athīr reports that ten 
thousand crusaders fell in battle and the leaders of Tripoli, Antioch, and Edessa were 
captured.135 Manuel, however, fulfilled his duty as a feudal lord and came to the rescue of 
his vassals.  Additionally, he demonstrated his dominance in the Syrian littoral and an 
unwillingness to tolerate outside intervention.  Nur ad-Din’s withdrawal in 1165 is 
indicative of the atabeg’s respect for Byzantine strength. 
 Byzantine control over Cilicia remained tenuous.  In fact, after 1168, Byzantium 
effectively lost the region to Thoros after his cousin Andronicus mismanaged affairs there.  
Manuel did, however, strengthen his hand in Jerusalem.  Baldwin III died in 1163 and was 
succeeded by Amalric, who sent an embassy to Constantinople to request the hand of a 
Komnene daughter just as his brother did nine years earlier.  In 1167, Amalric married a 
niece of Manuel’s, the thirteen-year-old Maria.   
Amalric reportedly made the same oaths as his brother did and renounced any right 
to dictate affairs in Antioch.136   It is likely that Amalric and Manuel also discussed a 
possible expedition against the ailing Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt.  Just four months after the 
                                                          
133 Kinnamos, 164; William of Tyre, 2: 306-10. William of Tyre is conspicuously silent regarding 
Byzantine assistance in the matter. 
134 Kinnamos, 172. 
135 Amin Maalouf, The Crusades Through the Arab Eyes. Trans. Jon Rothschild (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1984), 163. 
136 Ibid., 179. 
59 
 
wedding celebrations, Byzantine diplomats were in Jerusalem discussing terms for 
Byzantine involvement in the affair.137 
 By 1168, the Byzantine position in Outremer was at its highest since the early 
eleventh century under Basil II.  Manuel saved the crusader states from almost certain 
doom after the appalling loss at Harim in 1164, which served to increase his prestige in the 
West and reinforced his authority in Outremer.  The Frankish East was more or less secure 
as long as Manuel could prevent any further incursions across the frontier with Nur ad-Din.  
The only viable area for activity was Egypt, which was eyed greedily by all the eastern 
powers. 
The pacification of the Balkans 
Byzantine strategy in the Balkans during the 1160s was complicated by the death of Géza II 
in 1162.  Before his death, the king nominated his son as his successor in violation of 
Hungarian law, which demanded that the throne pass to the eldest brother.138  Both of 
Géza’s brothers had fled to Constantinople years earlier, and one of them, Stephen, married 
into the Komneni household.  Naturally, Manuel supported the claim of Stephen so that he 
could install a puppet of the Hungarian throne.  However, the Hungarians rejected him 
outright to prevent an indirect rule from Constantinople.139 
 Manuel led an army to the Danube in support of Stephen’s candidacy, forcing Géza’s 
son, Stephen III (1162-72), to abdicate.  The Hungarians still rejected the elder Stephen and 
instead chose Géza’s younger brother, Lazlo, as the king.  However, Lazlo’s early death in 
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1163 prompted a return of Stephen III.140  Manuel recognized that the elder Stephen would 
likely never acquire the throne and thus switched his support to Géza’s youngest son, Béla. 
In 1164, Stephen III signed a treaty with Manuel, which recognized Béla as the heir to the 
Hungarian crown in exchange for his gesture.  Béla was widely popular amongst the 
Hungarians and thus was an ideal candidate to take the throne after Stephen III.  
Additionally, Stephen gave Béla Dalmatia and Croatia as an appanage and allowed the 
emperor to raise him as a son in Constantinople.141  The emperor married him to his 
daughter in 1164.  Béla would prove useful to him in later years. 
 In the meantime, Stephen gathered an alliance to fight against Byzantium. He hoped 
a decisive victory against Manuel would allow him to name his own son as heir in violation 
of the recent treaty.  He conspired with Germany for support and had already won over the 
Serbs, the Russian principalities of Gallich and Kiev, and even the Czech king.  For the 
moment, the situation in the Balkans was critical.  Some minor military engagements 
accomplished nothing for either side.   The elder Stephen continued to press his claims to 
the throne but ran out of time and friends.  Early in 1165, he was poisoned by an aide, and 
his base, a Byzantine fortress, at Zevgminon on the Danube fell to King Stephen.  Manuel 
declared war to avenge the murder and recover his important fortress. 142 
 Manuel successfully stripped Stephen of his Russian support by diplomacy late in 
1164.  The emperor then moved against Stephen’s Serb allies and brought the entire 
Dalmatian coast under his dominion.  The Serbian župan, Desa, swore to uphold his 
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previous oaths and become a faithful vassal.  However, Manuel sent him to Constantinople 
to spend the rest of his days in captivity.143  German support eroded as Barbarossa devoted 
more of his attention to his Italian possessions.  Manuel was now free to do as he wished in 
Hungary.  In 1165, Manuel recaptured all the forts along the Danube lost to the Hungarians 
earlier.   
 Stephen begged for peace after the loss of Zevgminon and promised not to cross the 
Danube again.  Manuel accepted Stephen’s peace overtures but remained vigilant.  Stephen 
attempted to reclaim several forts on the Danube in 1166, but was repulsed. In response, 
Manuel launched a large assault that devastated Stephen’s lands.  Stephen made a 
successful counter-attack, prompting a grand Byzantine campaign in 1167.  Manuel 
launched a three-pronged attack and achieved a tremendous victory over a large 
Hungarian force under Dionysius at Sirmium.144   
 Hungary was humiliated in the subsequent treaty.  The Hungarian king was 
considered an appointee of the emperor, the Hungarian church was brought under the 
dominion of Constantinople, and Manuel claimed all of Dalmatia and the Danube.145  Serbia 
needed an additional reminder to maintain positive behavior in 1168, but the Balkans 
remained quiescent for the rest of Manuel’s reign.  The subjugation of Hungary was 
Manuel’s greatest victory, militarily and politically.  
                                                          
143 Kinnamos, 162. 
144 Kinnamos, 208; Choniates, 89. 
145 Michael  "Anchialos", "A New Source on Byzantine-Hungarian Relations in the Twelfth Century: 
the Inaugural Lecture of Michael Б τον Άγχιάλον as ϋπατος τών ϕιλοόϕων’" Ed. Robert Browning. Balkan 
Studies, no. 2 (1961): 173-214. 
62 
 
 Manuel was determined to capitalize on the circumstances resulting from the death 
of Géza II in 1162.  Géza’s choice to nominate his son as heir had created a chaotic political 
atmosphere where several men now had a legitimate claim to the Hungarian throne.  
Manuel exacerbated this chaos by supporting a rival claimant.  He hoped that the low-key 
strategy of supporting the elder Stephen would pay off.  When this failed, he systematically 
isolated King Stephen and destroyed him.  Additionally, he adopted Stephen’s younger 
brother, Béla, for use in his long-term strategy.  After Sirmium, both Hungary and Serbia 
ceased to pose a threat to Byzantine interests.  Indeed, Hungary under Stephen became a 
dutiful vassal.  This was especially true after Stephen’s death in 1172, when the Hungarian 
nobility requested the emperor to send Béla to them as king. 
Manuel and Barbarossa vie for Italy 
During the early 1160s, Pope Alexander III (1159-81) sent an embassy to Manuel 
requesting aid against the German Empire.  Alexander was struggling in his bid to hold the 
papacy against the German-supported anti-pope, Victor IV.  In 1162, Alexander was forced 
to flee Rome after he was briefly arrested by supporters of Victor IV.  Desperate, Alexander 
sought a new ally in Byzantium.  The embattled pope promised Manuel “the vanities of 
vanities, which he had not expected.”146  Alexander’s letter piqued Manuel’s interest.   
To understand what this could have meant to Manuel, it is necessary to briefly 
describe the schism between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches.  There were theological 
issues that divided the two churches, including the metaphysical nature of Christ, the role 
                                                          
146 F. Güterbock, "Le leterre del notario imperiale Burcardo intorno allay politica del Barbarossa nello 
scisma ed alla distruzione di Milano," Bullettino dell'Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, no, 11 (1949): 
57. 
63 
 
of the Holy Trinity, and the Eucharist.  Politically and ecclesiastically, the question of the 
primacy of Rome, the universal authority of the pope, and the role of the emperor in the 
church caused a further rift between Rome and Constantinople.  These were difficult issues 
to contend with – some still exist today.   
 Manuel’s negotiations with the papacy represent one of the most serious 
components in the charge that Byzantine imperial policy was beyond the capability of his 
empire.  Worse yet, many historians view Manuel’s policy in the West as pernicious to 
Byzantine interests.  However, Manuel needed to limit the growing power of Barbarossa.  
Kinnamos states that there were serious concerns of a German invasion of Byzantium: 
“Therefore the emperor Manuel himself became concerned as to how he could check his 
advance, lest his unexpected success should turn against the Romans’ land, at which from a 
long time back he had cast a greedy eye.”147  This was especially troubling given the 
diplomatic overtures between the Germans and Hungarians.  If Manuel could create enough 
trouble for Frederick on his Italian frontier, it would relieve the pressure on the Byzantine 
northwestern frontier.   
To this end, the emperor devoted considerable resources to curbing German 
expansion in Italy.  He continued the diplomatic exchanges with the papacy.148  He also 
created a vast array of allies in the west to counter the influence of Barbarossa.  Manuel 
continued his alliance with Sicily after the death of William I in 1166 and offered his 
                                                          
147 Kinnamos, 172 
148 Angold, 212. 
64 
 
successor, William II, the hand of his daughter Maria.149  In 1162, when the great city of 
Milan fell to Barbarossa, Manuel dispatched several agents to shore up the defenses of the 
other Italian city-states.  Byzantine agents created and funded a defensive pact of northern 
Italian city-states later known as the League of Verona.  Choniates states that, “There were 
no cities in Italy or even in more distant regions where the emperor did not have someone 
sworn to be faithful to his cause.  Indeed, these men reported to the emperor whatever 
mischief and intrigue the enemies of the Romans contrived behind closed doors.”150   
The fall of Milan had induced Alexander to flee Italy for the safety of France, 
whereupon Barbarossa installed his pretender, Paschal III (1164-68), who crowned 
Barbarossa as the emperor of Rome.151   The papacy was in serious trouble.  To all 
appearances, an agreement between Manuel and Alexander seemed feasible.  Manuel was 
willing to acquiesce to Alexander in almost all of the politically dividing issues.  He 
interpreted the Donation of Constantine, the document that supposedly transferred Roman 
imperial authority to the papacy, in a manner that accepted the spiritual supremacy of 
Rome and maintained the imperial seat in Constantinople.152  The pope would gain 
dominion over the eastern churches and Manuel could claim hegemony over the Italian 
city-states.   
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However, in 1167, the negotiations stalled.  Both the Latin and Greek sources are in 
agreement that the negotiations did not produce an alliance because the Pope did not fulfill 
his side of the bargain.  Specifically, Kinnamos claims that an agreement was not reached 
because Alexander believed that it was impossible to separate the imperial and religious 
nature of Rome.153   
 A more likely reason was that Alexander no longer needed Manuel’s support.  In the 
summer of 1167, Barbarossa’s army was ravaged by disease and forced to withdraw from 
the Italian frontier.154  If Manuel was successful in the east because Nur ad-Din kept the 
crusaders in fear, he failed in the west because he was unable to take advantage of 
Barbarossa’s threat before it receded.  However, the opportunity was too great not to try.  A 
union with Rome would have been a strong check to the expansion of Barbarossa’s power 
in Italy.  Manuel envisioned himself as a feudal overlord of the Italian provinces.  They 
would swear fealty to him for assured protection against the Germans, and papal blessings 
would legitimize the Byzantine presence.   
The potential alliance with Alexander was important enough for the emperor to 
personally intervene in a doctrinal controversy during this period.  He ensured that the 
resolution of the controversy gave the impression that the Byzantines were not overtly 
hostile to Catholic ideology.155  All of Manuel’s diplomatic guile was utilized in order to 
bring this alliance to fruition.  The recognition of Byzantium as the sole legitimate Christian 
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empire would have brought boundless prestige and influence to Manuel.  Additionally, a 
strong alliance consisting of the northern Italian city-states, the papacy, and Byzantium 
would have effectively ended German expansion across the Alps. 
1160-1168 in summary 
By the end of 1168, the Byzantine Empire had made considerable progress in reversing the 
disaster of Manzikert, which had occurred just a century earlier.  Manuel was the 
undisputed master of Outremer.  Komnene daughters were married to the rulers of Antioch 
and Jerusalem.  Antioch was essentially a fief of the empire, regardless of any blustering of 
its prince.  Manuel’s authority was challenged only in Cilicia, and this occurred because of 
several diplomatic blunders which had greatly angered the Armenians.  Manuel would later 
regain the Cilician plain, but the Armenian kingdom was quite hostile to Byzantine interests 
for the foreseeable future. 
 Manuel had pacified the Seljuks at Ikonion.  The emperor won a number of 
significant victories against the sultan early in the decade, forcing him to accept vassalage.  
For several years thereafter, Kiliҫ Arslan played the role of a faithful client.  He supplied 
troops for Byzantine campaigns in 1166 and 1167 and routinely attacked marauding 
Turkoman hordes.  Arslan was encouraged to maintain friendly relations with Manuel by 
the presence of Byzantine allies along his frontiers.  As long as the sultan was surrounded 
by powerful foes, the emperor could be assured of his correct conduct.   
 Byzantium permanently defeated the Hungarians with the glorious victory at 
Sirmium in 1167.  Manuel had a unique opportunity to control the Hungarian throne after 
the death of Géza.  The emperor was unable to do this peacefully and created a much bigger 
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problem in the process.  The young Hungarian king was able to create a sizable coalition to 
combat Byzantium.  However, Manuel skillfully dismantled Stephen’s diplomatic apparatus 
and destroyed Hungarian power.  Additionally, he broke Serb resistance and permanently 
gained control of the Balkans up to the Danube and westward to Dalmatia.    The extent of 
the Byzantine victory in 1167 cannot be overstated.  The guarantee of the empire’s 
northern border gave Manuel the luxury of planning larger expeditions, such as his 
Egyptian campaign of 1169.   
 The emperor’s final activity during this period was his diplomatic maneuvering with 
the papacy and the Italian cities in opposition to Barbarossa.  Manuel was largely successful 
in this area because he did safeguard Italy against the Germans.  The League of Verona was 
bankrolled almost exclusively by Manuel and would have collapsed without his support.  
Indeed, it was Byzantine funds that helped to rebuild Milan after it was sacked in 1162.156  
Angold correctly states that “support throughout Italy was necessary if negotiations with 
the papacy over the imperial office were to have any chance of success.”157  By 1169, 
Byzantine influence was exceptionally strong throughout Italy.  While Manuel was 
unsuccessful in wooing Alexander III, he would continue the attempt into the next decade.  
This political setback notwithstanding, Alexander was obliged to maintain his cordial 
relationship with Manuel.  Barbarossa had left Italy, but would soon return.   The emperor’s 
grand efforts and his persistence are indicative of the perceived rich rewards if he were 
successful, and Manuel clearly thought it was possible.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: FAILURE AND THE END OF THE KOMNENI REVIVAL 
During the final eleven years of Manuel’s reign, the emperor experienced three major 
setbacks: the abject failure of the Egyptian campaign, his defeat at Myriokephalon, and the 
collapse of his political intrigue in the west.  Historians are often critical of Manuel for his 
handling or even involvement in these affairs.  However, these activities were not only 
indicative of a perceptive imperial strategy, but were also essential to continued Byzantine 
success in the applicable spheres of influence.  By 1169, the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt was 
severely weakened.  It was merely a determination of who would acquire the caliphate’s 
vast wealth.  Thus, Manuel conspired with King Amalric of Jerusalem (1163-74) not only to 
acquire a portion of this area, but also to deny access to Nur ad-Din. 
 By 1174, it was clear that the peaceful coexistence between Manuel and Kiliҫ Arslan 
of Ikonion was no longer possible.  Manuel fortified the frontier zones and moved against 
the recalcitrant sultan.  However, he was soundly defeated and forced to come to terms 
with the sultan.  According to his contemporaries, this defeat drained the emperor of his 
spirit, and Manuel sank into a depression that slowly ended his life. 
 Manuel continued his political machinations in Italy.  It appeared that the Byzantine 
interests were at an impasse: Manuel could seek an alliance with either the papacy or with 
Germany.  Alexander had demonstrated an unwillingness to formalize relations with 
Constantinople, but the prospect of a Byzantine-papal alliance was enough to induce the 
Germans to talk peace.  Thus, Henry the Lion of Saxony, one of Barbarossa’s most trusted 
men, personally negotiated a truce between the two emperors.  However, Frederick 
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Barbarossa outmaneuvered Manuel and worked to remove Byzantine influence from the 
Italian scene.   
The Egyptian campaign 
Steven Runciman perceptively states that the “existence of the Latin states depended…on 
disunion amongst their Moslem neighbors.  Moslem Syria was now united: but so long as 
Egypt was at enmity with Nur ad-Din, the situation was not desperate.”158  During the 
1150s, the Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt was wracked by a series of assassinations and coups 
d’état that severely weakened the grip of the central government.  In 1163, the new king of 
Jerusalem made the conquest of Egypt his primary goal.  He invaded Egypt under the 
pretext of the Egyptians not paying the yearly tribute of 160,000 dinars promised to 
Baldwin III in 1160.159  Amalric was forced to withdraw when Nur ad-Din launched a major 
invasion of northern Syria in his absence.   
The situation was further complicated when Shawar, the ex-vizier, escaped Egypt 
and appeared in Nur ad-Din’s court.  He promised to pay for the army’s expenses if Nur ad-
Din would send an army to Cairo to help him reclaim power.160  Nur ad-Din hesitantly 
obliged and sent Shirkuh to Egypt.  After Shawar was restored to power in May of 1164, he 
forsook his promise to Nur ad-Din and demanded that Shirkuh return to Syria.  When 
Shirkuh refused, Shawar dispatched emissaries to Amalric to seek his help in evicting Nur 
ad-Din’s general from his base at Bilbeis.  Amalric invaded Egypt and came close to 
capturing Bilbeis and Shirkuh.  However, the disaster at Harim forced him to hasten to 
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Syria and allow Shirkuh to return to Nur-ad Din.  The Frankish and Syrian armies marched 
along parallel routes from Egypt. 
For the next several years, Amalric had to repulse several raids from both Nur ad-
Din and Shirkuh.  In 1167, Shirkuh obtained permission to launch another invasion of 
Egypt.  Shirkuh even convinced the caliph in Baghdad to declare jihad against the heretical 
Shia caliphate.161  Shawar immediately called upon Amalric for assistance.  Shirkuh and 
Amalric again fought each other to a standstill.  Amalric likely could have pressed further 
against Shirkuh, but he was nervous about the safety of his realm in his absence.  In August 
of 1167, both the Syrian and Frankish armies left Egypt.  For Amalric, it was now clear that 
he would need outside assistance to conquer Egypt. 
In 1168, Amalric concluded negotiations with the Byzantines for a joint venture 
against Egypt.  The exact details of these negotiations are unknown, but it is clear that there 
would be some sort of sharing of the spoils.162  Before Byzantine assistance arrived, 
however, Amalric was obliged by the Knights Hospitaller and his barons to launch an 
immediate assault lest Egypt fall to Nur ad-Din.  Amalric invaded Egypt in October of 1168.  
The expedition came very close to capturing Cairo; however, indiscriminate Frankish 
violence ruined the opportunity.  Not only did Amalric lose the element of surprise, but he 
unified Egypt against the Franks by slaughtering many Copts and Muslims in Bilbeis.  Ibn 
al-Athīr notes that “if the Franj had acted differently in Bilbays, they could have taken Cairo 
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with the greatest of ease, for the city’s notables were prepared to surrender it.  But when 
they heard of the massacres perpetrated in Bilbays, people decided to resist regardless.”163  
Amalric retired from Egypt after the vizier, Shawar, promised several large payments.  
However, Amalric later learned that Nur ad-Din dispatched his general Shirkuh to Egypt at 
Shawar’s invitation.164  Amalric had been duped. 
 Shirkuh arrived in Egypt in the spring of 1169 and quickly eliminated the unpopular 
vizier.  The crusaders’ worst nightmare was dangerously close to reality:  Nur ad-Din was 
nominally in control of a vast tract of land from Egypt to Aleppo.  The crusaders were 
surrounded.  It is, therefore, not surprising that Amalric appeared distracted during the 
joint campaign with Byzantium.  The assumption of the Greek historians that Amalric 
vacillated purely out of greed is unfair and betrays a lack of understanding as to the 
severity of the loss of Egypt.165  The fact that the crusaders now faced a two-front war 
against a united enemy was not lost upon Amalric.  This does not, however, excuse the 
king’s indecision. 
 The Byzantine commander, Andronikos Kontostephanos, attempted to work with 
the increasingly taciturn Amalric.  Amalric was hesitant to launch the invasion and believed 
that Egypt was already lost.  It was not until the end of September that Kontostephanos 
convinced the king to begin the invasion beginning with a siege against Damietta along the 
mouth of the Nile.  Once in Egypt, things went from bad to worse.  Amalric’s delay was 
unfortunate for two reasons.  First, Choniates notes that the Byzantine force was only 
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provisioned long enough for a three-month-long campaign.  Kontostephanos was unable to 
resupply in Cyprus or in Acre, and his Frankish allies were largely unwilling to help – the 
Byzantine mission was running out of time.166  Second, Salah ad-Din, Shirkuh’s nephew and 
successor, received ample warning of the approaching Christian force and prepared the 
best he could. 
 As Byzantine forces ran out of food and supplies, Amalric lost heart in the face of the 
impressive fortifications of Damietta.  It is unclear whether Amalric or Kontostephanos 
made the first peace overtures, but before the end of 1169, the Christians were burning the 
siege equipment.  The Byzantine expedition ended in disaster when a large portion of the 
Byzantine fleet was lost during the return voyage home.167  Manuel was doubtless 
disgusted by Kontostephanos’s report in the spring of 1170, but the emperor did not 
abandon his alliance with the crusaders.  Amalric attempted to salvage the situation by 
submitting his crown to the vassalage of Constantinople.168 
 The Egyptian campaign was a great opportunity for both Byzantium and the 
crusader states.  For Byzantium, a successful venture would have further heightened the 
perception that Manuel was the leading Christian general.  The campaign also would have 
represented a limited return of former Byzantine lands.  It is no accident that both 
Choniates and Kinnamos mention the great revenue that used to flow from Egypt as well as 
the bountiful harvest of grain and rice when making the case for invasion.  Even the 
prospect of seizing a portion of Egypt was very tempting for Manuel.   Aside from the 
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material gain, the single largest reason Amalric needed to move against Egypt was the 
danger associated with inaction.  It is unlikely that Amalric would have intentionally 
torpedoed the expedition just to spite Manuel.  The safeguarding of his western flank was 
surely worth a Byzantine presence along the coast.  The trouble was convincing his barons 
of this.  Amalric attempted to placate both the barons and Manuel, all while pressing 
forward against Egypt.  His indecisiveness spoiled the campaign and sealed the eventual 
fate of the Frankish east.  Outremer was now surrounded by a largely unified and 
determined enemy. 
Barbarossa outmaneuvers Manuel 
Manuel continued to pursue an alliance with Rome at the expense of the German emperor 
after Barbarossa was forced to retreat from Rome in 1167.  In 1169, Manuel strengthened 
his ties to Otto Frangipani, Alexander III’s most influential backer in Rome by sending him a 
Komnene bride with a substantial dowry.169  Although Barbarossa’s anti-pope had crowned 
him emperor of the Romans in 1167, Alexander remained hostile and decried the affair as a 
sham.  Barbarossa was concerned that continued Byzantine-papal relations could indeed 
result in some sort of union.  Thus, the marriage was disturbing enough to Barbarossa to 
send his imperial chancellor, Christian of Mainz, to Constantinople to begin a peaceable 
dialogue.170  Here is the crux of Manuel’s strategy in regards to the west:  If he could not 
accomplish a union with the papacy (which he sought in order to curb German expansion 
in Italy and for the glory it would bring to the empire), then Manuel would use the prospect 
                                                          
169 Magdalino, 84. 
170 Ibid., 92; Ohnsorge, 456-86. 
74 
 
of such an alliance to end hostilities with Barbarossa.  Manuel intended to withdraw his 
support for Alexander III if Barbarossa would acquiesce to a Byzantine presence in Italy. 
 Diplomatic feelers continued from the German court to Constantinople after 1170.  
Manuel even offered the hand of his daughter, Maria, to Barbarossa’s son while negotiating 
with Henry the Lion of Saxony in 1172.171  This was problematic as Maria was currently 
engaged to William II of Sicily.  Romauld of Salerno states that William waited in vain for 
the arrival of his Byzantine bride and only learned of Manuel’s negotiations with the 
Germans in passing.172  William was furious.  Manuel used the improved relations with 
Barbarossa to cement ties with Venice’s primary rivals, Genoa and Pisa.  Before 1172, the 
two maritime city-states were cautious in its dealings with Byzantium as a matter of 
deference to Barbarossa.  The acquisition of these two trading partners, and rivals of 
Venice, allowed the emperor break with Venice by expelling the Venetians from 
Constantinople and confiscating their goods – punishment for long standing greed and 
corruption.173   
The attempt to re-establish relations with the German empire represents a dramatic 
reorientation of Manuel’s policy.  Since Conrad III’s death in 1152, the cold war with 
Frederick Barbarossa was a staple of Byzantine western policy.  The prospect of ending the 
feud with the Germans induced Manuel to insult William of Sicily and lash out against 
Venice.  Why?  First, the prospect of a strong partner in the west was extremely tempting.  
Second, by the end of 1172, it appeared that Barbarossa would guarantee Byzantine 
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hegemony in the Balkans and the Adriatic coastline of Italy as long as Manuel would give up 
his negotiations with Alexander III – whose promises proved false anyway. 
Magdalino states that Manuel’s primary interest in Italy had always been the eastern 
strip of the peninsula from Otranto to Ancona, or possibly as far north as Ravenna.174  
Cardinal Boso supports this statement by his acknowledgement that Manuel requested 
three coastal towns in Apulia from the pope and Barbarossa before his initial successes in 
Italy during the 1150s.175  In 1158, Rahewin, Otto of Freising’s secretary, describes 
Barbarossa’s rage upon hearing that Byzantine agents were spreading Byzantine influence 
past Ancona.176  However, he later reports that a German delegation sent to Constantinople 
in 1160 returned with “a request of the prince of Constantinople concerning the coasts of 
Pentapolis (Ancona and its environs) and Apulia.”177  Since Manuel had been in possession 
of Ancona since the late 1150s, Manuel was attempting to gain German acceptance of the 
Byzantine presence.  The innocuous characterization of Manuel’s request and the lack of a 
hostile both suggest that Barbarossa was not overtly hostile to some sort of Byzantine 
presence along the Italian Adriatic coast.  During the 1160s, Manuel felt that Alexander was 
his best option for an ally in Italy, and thus aborted his negotiations with Barbarossa over 
Ancona and Apulia. 
Given the decade-long rivalry with Barbarossa, why would Manuel expect 
Barbarossa to acquiesce to any Byzantine presence in Italy during the 1170s?  Barbarossa 
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likely intimated that he was ready to make territorial concessions in Italy that Alexander 
and William II had been unwilling to make.  Magdalino states that for Manuel to snub 
William II, toss aside his alliance with Venice, and consider withdrawing his support from 
the papacy, Barbarossa must have offered Manuel something of vast importance.178  
Manuel carefully weighed his options and concluded that peace with Germany was within 
the empire’s best interests. 
The abandonment of Venice and Sicily was not a major risk.  Sicily was a second-rate 
power.  Manuel had accepted William II as an ally because he needed friends to counter the 
influence of Barbarossa.  If Manuel and Barbarossa were on friendly terms, then William 
would be less useful as an ally.  Venice was, at best, a troublesome ally.  It had often 
extorted large sums of money from Byzantine officials, and its notorious unreliability 
disrupted more than one military operation.  Rapprochement with Barbarossa had the 
added benefit of casting Venice aside and allying with its Italian maritime rivals, Genoa and 
Pisa. 
However, this rapprochement with Germany proved to be illusory.  Barbarossa had 
no intention of giving Manuel a free hand in Italy; rather, it appears that Barbarossa sought 
to weaken the Byzantine position.  After Manuel abrogated the marriage contract with 
Sicily and ordered the arrest of all Venetians and the seizure of their goods, a large German 
force under Christian of Mainz attacked Ancona in concert with the Venetians.  The 
Germans cited Byzantine activity in Lombardy as their justification for the attack.  There 
were, indeed, Byzantine officials based in Ancona, midway on Italy’s Adriatic coast.  It 
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appears that Manuel felt secure enough in his relations with Barbarossa to extend his 
influence north towards Ravenna.  An Italian account states that the Byzantine mission was 
to “buy certain cities’ and citizens’ properties and return these to them in fief.”179  
Choniates does not specify what these officials’ exact mission was but states that when 
Barbarossa learned of it, he “flew into a rage and sent his troops to lay siege to Ancona.”180   
  Manuel had miscalculated.  The conflict with Barbarossa entered a new phase of 
open hostility.  It appears that once Manuel broke with Sicily and Venice, Barbarossa 
abandoned the prospect of peace with Byzantium.  In 1174, several Byzantine peace 
delegations were rebuffed without any response from the Germans.  By 1175, it was clear 
that Manuel’s western policy was in peril.  Magdalino states that “Manuel had been beaten 
at his own game of double bluff.”181  Manuel lost two allies in Sicily and Venice, both of 
which allied with Barbarossa against Byzantium.  The emperor also gained a reputation for 
treachery. 
However, the scale of Manuel’s diplomatic failure should not be overstated.  Ancona 
survived the siege of 1173 without too much difficulty.182  Venice and Sicily were unable to 
do serious harm to the empire.  Venice was restricted in its action because of Manuel’s 
friendship with Genoa and Pisa, which had survived Barbarossa’s double-cross.    
Therefore, any Venetian foray into Byzantine waters had to contend not only with the 
imperial fleet but also that of the other Italian city-states.  Sicily, meanwhile, was rapidly 
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declining in power after the death of Roger II in 1154.  Neither William I nor his son 
William II was capable of matching the political and military prowess of Roger.  Sicily was 
even less of a threat than Venice. 
It is reasonable to state that, given the limited consequences of Manuel’s scheming 
in the west, Byzantium had very little to lose in attempting a renewed alliance with 
Barbarossa of Germany.  Conversely, Barbarossa lost a considerable number of men and 
material in forays into northern Italy from across the Alps.  The heavy burden of Italian 
operations created discontent in the German court, especially among Henry the Lion and 
his supporters.   
At this juncture, it is worth discussing what Manuel expected to gain as a result of 
his intrigue in Italy.  Why would the Italian city-states swear loyalty to Byzantium while 
fighting German overlordship?  The answer is quite practical – the wealthy Italian polities 
sought to exchange the nearby tyrant for a tyrant too far away to meddle in their affairs.  
Also, Manuel spoke in terms that were designed to make Byzantine dominion appear 
beneficial, if not profitable.  The emperor promised to double the income of any Lombard 
city that supported him.  Conversely, Barbarossa was viewed as fiscally oppressive and was 
quite unpopular amongst the wealthy Italian magnates.183  Thus, Manuel stood to gain 
several rich Italian regions along with the support of the northern Italian city-states.  They, 
in turn, would gain protection from Barbarossa at a large discount.  
 Sicily was more problematic as it was technically a papal fief.  If Manuel had 
achieved an alliance with Barbarossa, he could pressure the papacy in simply allowing a 
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Byzantine annexation of Sicily.  If Manuel’s negotiations with Alexander bore fruit, then 
Sicily could not act against Manuel without raising the ire of the pope.  The variety of 
options available to Manuel in regards to his Italian policy justify the importance he placed 
on receiving recognition from the papacy as the sole emperor of Rome.   While political and 
economic considerations provided the Italian city-states with an incentive to support 
Byzantium, they needed something more – legitimacy.  Papal recognition would serve this 
function quite well.  Ostrogorsky notes that “according to Byzantine conceptions, some 
rulers held a higher and lower rank within the hierarchy of rulers.  But the highest rank 
was held by the Roman emperor in Constantinople, as the bearer of the highest title of 
sovereign, as the head of the oldest Christian empire, and as the father of all Christian 
peoples and the head of the family of rulers.”184   
Therefore, it is likely that this was Manuel’s long-term strategy.  Papal recognition of 
Byzantine suzerainty in Italy would equate to a papal recognition of the Byzantine 
worldview.  Even if Manuel made peace with Barbarossa, it would have been a temporary 
measure to pressure Alexander into giving Manuel what he wanted.  Barbarossa saw the 
danger of an alliance between Byzantium and the papacy and moved to prevent it.  
However, Manuel’s most effective tool for intrigue with the papacy was still very much 
intact – the crusader states.  Events in the Anatolia were to allow the emperor another 
chance to demonstrate the power and efficacy of the empire.  Success in both spheres of 
influence was now dependent on success against Ikonion. 
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The Byzantine crusade 
Choniates begins the sixth book of his narrative by stating that Manuel and Arslan 
were like two brothers constantly fighting at the slightest pretext.  In his opinion, Arslan 
was effeminate but exercised great forethought, whereas Manuel was reckless and 
heroic.185  The author probably overstates the scale of any animosity that may have existed 
between the two, but relations had certainly cooled but by the 1170s.  Kinnamos states that 
Manuel was able to convince Arslan to desist in his plans to ally with Nur ad-Din and Mleh 
of Armenia in a joint venture against the crusader states and, possibly, Byzantium itself.186  
Arslan’s reluctance to definitively break with Manuel is indicative of the fact that there was 
still considerable distrust between him and Nur ad-Din.  However, this last obstacle to war 
cleared in 1174 when Nur ad-Din died. 
It is possible that Manuel sought to break his ties with Ikonion earlier than 1174, but 
until this point there was no real reason to do so.  The death of Nur ad-Din, however, 
greatly altered the political landscape of the east.  Now Arslan had a free hand to do as he 
wished in Anatolia since he no longer needed to fear the Crusaders or the Zengids.  The 
Crusaders were in political chaos following the death of Amalric.  The leper king, Baldwin 
IV, was young and weak.  In Syria, Salah ad-Din was consolidating his control over Syria 
and Egypt.  He had no reason to quarrel with Ikonion.  With his eastern frontier safe, Arslan 
now began to formally annex Danishmendid towns promised to Manuel.187  Arslan’s 
behavior combined with Manuel’s necessity to achieve some sort of Christian victory to 
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repair his reputation and salvage his western strategy.  Additionally, Magdalino states that 
a unified Seljuk entity in Anatolia could jeopardize the pilgrim road towards Outremer.188  
If Manuel could not ensure the Christian pilgrim route, what use was he as the protector of 
the crusaders? 
Thus, Manuel envisioned a campaign that could satisfy the needs of his different 
spheres of influence.  In Anatolia, it was vital that he check the growing power of Kiliҫ 
Arslan.  In Jerusalem, Baldwin IV’s regent courted the idea of requesting German assistance 
through William of Montferrat.189  William came to Outremer in the mid-1170s to seek his 
fortunes amongst the crusaders.  He was related to both Frederick Barbarossa and Louis 
VII.  Many barons in the court at Jerusalem believed he could secure either German or 
French assistance.  The likelihood of this possibility is ultimately irrelevant; Manuel felt 
that his entire eastern policy was in danger.     
The emperor sought to demonstrate to Western Christians how effective a crusade 
could be if it were properly led.  The emperor carefully, but quickly, fortified Anatolia.  He 
rebuilt the fortresses of Dorylaion and Souvleon to command the northern and western 
approaches to Ikonion.190  Manuel then sent a letter to Alexander III requesting aid for the 
venture.  In turn, Alexander wrote to Peter, the cardinal of St. Crisogono, in January of 1176 
and encouraged him to gather support for the Byzantine crusade: 
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[Manuel] has constructed a certain great and populous city in the middle of the land 
of the Sultan of Iconium, where he has placed Latins and Greeks to defend it, and by 
this city he dominates a great region of the Turks, so much so that he has restored 
the road for all Christians, both Greeks and latins, to visit the Lord’s Sepulchre.191 
Manuel planned nothing less than the complete subjugation of Ikonion.  Renewed 
peace would not have served Byzantine interests, and thus he rejected several missives 
from the sultan.192  Manuel did not accept Arslan’s peace overtures for two reasons.  First, 
he needed a significant victory.  There would be no glory in simply checking the power of 
Ikonion.  The successful capture of Ikonion, by contrast would be the most significant 
Christian victory since the liberation of Jerusalem in 1099. Second, if Manuel successfully 
took the Seljuk capital, it would seriously weaken Arslan’s legitimacy.  The Seljuks took 
great pride in their cosmopolitan cities, Ikonion especially.  Ultimately, the Seljuks differed 
from the nomadic Turkomen only in their possession of a formidable base of central power 
at Ikonion.  If Manuel took that base, the Seljuks might collapse into political chaos. 
In the spring of 1176, after extensive planning and preparation, Manuel launched 
the crusade against Ikonion.  The campaign began smoothly enough.  Seljuk resistance in 
the western part of the sultanate evaporated in the face of such a tremendous Byzantine 
force.  Manuel rejected yet another peace offering from the sultan before setting up camp at 
Chonai.  The sultan was finally convinced that he could not talk his way out of the situation 
and prepared a series of ambuscades around the pass of Tzivritzē, just past the ruined 
fortress of Myriokephalon.193  According to Choniates, Manuel marched his army into the 
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trap in spite of the protests of his senior generals on 17 September 1176.194  The Byzantine 
right flank, consisting of Antiochene auxiliaries that were led by Manuel’s brother-in-law 
Baldwin, was annihilated and fell to the man in a final blaze of glory.   
Choniates varies wildly in his description of the battle.  Manuel was, at times, a 
coward who had given in to despair and was cruelly mocked by his troops.195  At other 
times, Manuel bravely fought through numerous attempts to capture him while displaying 
superhuman strength.  During the battle of Myriokephalon, Manuel took a brief respite 
underneath a wild pear tree.  He was exhausted, wounded, and his nerves were rattled.196  
During this moment of despair, the emperor’s strength and bravery wavered, but only for a 
moment.   
The critique of Manuel’s personal behavior notwithstanding, the emperor was able 
to extricate the bulk of his forces from a very dangerous situation.  The sultan was 
surprisingly generous in his terms: Manuel had to raze Souvleon and Dorylaion on the 
return trip home.197  Manuel did indeed destroy the fort at Souvleon but chose not to honor 
the condition at Dorylaion.  The sultan sent an army to force the issue, but Manuel easily 
defeated it.198  Given these circumstances, why is the battle of Myriokephalon considered 
such a major disaster?  Much of this is because of contemporary perceptions of the battle. 
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According to Choniates, the emperor sent word to the capital detailing the day’s 
events.  He compared himself to Romanus Diogenes, who had lost a large Roman army a 
century earlier at Manzikert.199  William of Tyre supported that interpretation by 
portraying the emperor as a shattered man whose mental health was in question. 200  By 
contrast, Manuel later wrote a letter to Henry II of England in which he implied that the 
battle was not so much a loss as a setback.  He continues by stating that the pack animals 
carrying the siege engines had been killed making an assault on Ikonion unlikely.  
Therefore, Manuel graciously accepted the sultan’s peace offering.201   
At Myriokephalon, Manuel lost a great opportunity to crush the power of the Seljuks 
and repair his damaged prestige.  This is not to say that the expedition was doomed from 
its inception; Manuel was remarkably close to realizing his objectives.  Aside from the 
considerable embarrassment of defeat, the only direct consequence of Myriokephalon was 
that the Byzantine army lost the opportunity to take Ikonion.  The battle was Arslan’s to 
lose – a loss here could have precipitated a Byzantine reconquista.  Manuel’s tactical 
blunder before the pass of Tzivritzē ended the possibility for the moment.  However, the 
imperial war machine was more than capable of launching another assault.  The Komneni 
revival did not end with Myriokephalon. 
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The empire after Myriokephalon 
Not long after Myriokephalon, the Byzantine position in Italy suffered a major setback.  In 
May of 1176, Barbarossa had again invaded northern Italy.  Manuel was unable to 
participate in the defense Italian city-states because of his preparations for the crusade 
against Ikonion.  However, Barbarossa was decisively defeated, and nearly killed, in battle 
against the Lombard League (the former League of Verona) at Legnano.  Alexander took 
advantage of Barbarossa’s humiliation and forced him to come to terms.  Manuel and his 
contributions were ignored.  Alexander denied any knowledge of Byzantine activities in 
Ancona.202  In the subsequent Treaty of Venice, signed in 1177, Barbarossa pledged his 
support to Alexander and allowed him to return to Rome.  In exchange, Alexander 
recognized Barbarossa as the sole emperor of Rome.  Byzantium was surprised by the 
papal volte-face.  Kinnamos decries the affair as a “shabby and servile trick.”203 Without 
papal support, Ancona and the Italian coastline fell to German influence without difficulty.  
For over thirty years, Byzantium had been a major factor in the Italian scene.  After the 
rapprochement between Alexander and Barbarossa, Manuel became irrelevant.   
Barbarossa began to intervene in Byzantine spheres of influence by sending 
emissaries to Kiliҫ Arslan and pledging to send an army to Outremer.  Barbarossa rebuffed 
Manuel’s outrage in a patronizing and disrespectful manner.204  Manuel’s Italian strategy 
was in tatters.  Undaunted, Manuel continued to seek allies in the west.  The cold war 
between Barbarossa and Manuel appeared to enter a new phase.  Both parties sought allies 
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to counter the influence of the other, but both emperors continued to communicate 
regarding matters of Christian unity.205  Ultimately, as long as Manuel was willing to accept 
that Italy was lost to the empire, the conflict was largely quiet.  For the moment, Manuel 
accepted this, as he desired to launch another offensive against Ikonion. 
Manuel also continued to work for the security of the crusader states after 
Myriokephalon.  The emperor sent a large fleet to Palestine to coincide with the arrival of 
Philip of Flanders in 1177.  This Franco-Byzantine alliance was supposed to attack Egypt to 
relieve pressure on the crusaders’ southern flank.  The venture failed to produce any 
military victories, but Phillip stopped in Constantinople during his return trip and 
conducted negotiations with the emperor on behalf of Henry II of England and Louis VII of 
France.  The culmination of these discussions brought a French princess, Agnes, to 
Constantinople to marry Manuel’s young son and heir, Alexios.206  Manuel also secured the 
marriage of his daughter to the son of William of Montferrat.207  The extent of these 
negotiations reveals an energy that both Choniates and William of Tyre imply the emperor 
lost at Myriokephalon.   
Manuel was active militarily as well as diplomatically after Myriokephalon.  
Choniates tells of at least one campaign in which the emperor heroically rode to the 
defense of Klaudiopolis against the Seljuks towards the end of 1179.  Klaudiopolis was a 
long journey from the capital for an aging emperor who rode without his royal entourage 
or baggage and took very few breaks.  The mere sight of the emperor induced the Seljuks to 
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abandon the siege.208  The archbishop of Thessalonica, Eustathios, implies that the emperor 
was even more active than Choniates admits.209  Moreover, William of Tyre’s negative 
assessment of Manuel’s health and energy can possibly be attributed to the fact that 
William met with the emperor early in 1180 as he started to show signs of illness.  That 
was their first meeting since the battle of Myriokephalon.210 
The emperor became seriously ill in August of 1180.  Choniates casts one last 
personal assault at the emperor, stating that Manuel surrounded himself with self-serving 
cronies who espoused absurd theories based in astrology and divination.  They argued that 
Manuel would soon recover and conquer the known world.  Because of this, Manuel made 
no arrangements for his death and therefore placed the empire in crisis after his death.211  
While this assessment is false, for the first time since Alexios took the throne in 1081, 
Constantinople was without a strong, adult king. 
1169-1180 in summary 
On the surface, it appears that by 1180 the empire was in great danger. Frederick 
Barbarossa got the best of Manuel in Italy and severely damaged the Byzantine political 
apparatus – the fall of Ancona was particularly disheartening.  The grand Byzantine 
crusade against Ikonion came to ruin at the pass of Tzivritzē, resulting in a great loss of life.  
However, what were the direct consequences of these failed campaigns for the empire?  
Furthermore, were these expeditions worthwhile or simply exercises in folly? 
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 The expedition to Egypt was both necessary and, at least on the Byzantine side, well-
planned.  The Fatimid Caliphate was dying, and Nur ad-Din eyed Cairo with anticipation 
and greed.  Amalric of Jerusalem was quickly losing the opportunity to prevent a potential 
disaster.  The expedition of 1169 was the last best hope the crusaders had to prevent an 
encirclement by Nur ad-Din.  Manuel may not have truly needed the crusader states as an 
ally in the region; however, he was responsible for their safety in the eyes of the West.  
Byzantium was the most powerful Christian state in the East and, as the feudal lord of 
Outremer; he was obliged to support their existence.    
Manuel’s role as the protector of the crusaders was a powerful tool in his western 
policy.  His involvement in the expedition was beneficial for the empire in two respects:  
First, if the invasion were successful, the empire stood to reclaim some of the most 
lucrative areas of the old empire.  Second, Byzantine involvement would demonstrate to 
the west and the crusaders that Manuel took his role as the leading crusading general 
seriously.  Failure, although embarrassing, would bring no direct harm to the empire.  
However, if the crusader states were annihilated by the resurgent forces of Islam under 
Manuel’s watch, the West would never forgive him. 
Barbarossa’s political victory over Manuel was also embarrassing, but again, the 
direct consequences of this political defeat were limited.  The cold war between Barbarossa 
and Manuel lessened in intensity to a minor rivalry.  The papacy did not break with 
Constantinople, as revealed by the alliance with France:  Manuel never could have secured 
the marriage between Agnes of France and Alexios II without Alexander’s blessing.  Italy 
was, indeed, lost to Byzantium forever.  However, given the possible rewards – 
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reunification with Rome, a limited return of hegemony in Italy, thwarting Barbarossa’s 
territorial ambitions – the risks were worth the effort.  Manuel came very close to 
succeeding in his aims. 
  Myriokephalon was not a disaster on the scale of Manzikert.  After Myriokephalon, 
the Byzantine frontier did not collapse.  The army was mauled, but the majority of the 
losses were non-Greek auxiliaries.  There was also no political collapse after the defeat.  
Manuel’s objective – the capture of Ikonion – would not have erased the Seljuk threat in 
Anatolia, but it would have greatly harmed Kiliҫ Arslan’s reputation and weakened his 
status as a leader of a legitimate regional power.  Additionally, this would have represented 
the first successful crusade since the capture of Jerusalem in 1099.  Manuel would have 
been the hero of all Christendom.  Unfortunately, a single tactical – albeit major – blunder 
ruined the chance. 
The severity of these three failures has, historically, been overstated.  The empire 
was still strong at the time of Manuel’s death in 1180.  The Byzantine war machine was 
bruised but intact.  Manuel continued to expand his diplomatic network, even to France. 
The crises that disrupted the empire came after the emperor’s death.  The death of Manuel I 
Komnenos on 24 September 1180 was a blow to the empire far worse than Myriokephalon.  
Eustathios bitterly notes that, “It seems that it was to be our fate, as it pleased God, that 
with the fall of the emperor Manuel Komnenos there collapsed at the same time everything 
that was firm among the Greeks, and that when like the sun he left us, a great darkness 
descended upon us.”212  Even Choniates laments, “as events were to demonstrate after he 
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had departed this life, his thoughts and actions were both sound and reasonable; and 
shortly after this wise helmsman was cast overboard by circumstances, the ship of state 
sank.”213 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REIGN OF MANUEL I KOMNENOS 
As Manuel lay dying in September of 1180, he likely evaluated his thirty-seven-year rule in 
Constantinople.  Manuel was one of the most active Byzantine emperors since Basil II (958-
1025).  His campaigns extended Byzantine influence from northern Italy to Egypt.  
Historians argue that, like Basil II, Manuel overextended the empire so that it was no longer 
capable of maintaining its extensive frontier zones.  The argument of this essay is that the 
empire was not weakened by Manuel’s activities and that his campaigns were part of a 
cohesive and flexible imperial strategy. 
 In Outremer, Manuel attempted to continue his father’s plan of annexation of the 
crusader states.  However, the arrival of the Second Crusade demonstrated that direct 
control was not feasible:  Byzantine action against the Frankish states would surely invite 
western intervention.  Manuel thus modified his strategy from hostility to benevolence.  
The emperor felt compelled to sabotage the French component of the Second Crusade in 
order to secure his position as feudal overlord.  After the failures of Louis VII and Conrad 
III, it was apparent to the Frankish princes that no power other than Byzantium was 
capable of acting effectively on their behalf.   
 Manuel continued his policy of friendship with the crusader principalities in the 
1150s, beginning with the purchase of the rump of Edessa from Joscelin II’s widow.  He was 
perturbed to learn that the new master of Antioch, Raymond, did not reciprocate Byzantine 
good will.  The Armenians were also busy causing problems in Cilicia.  Manuel chose not to 
crush the two recalcitrant vassals, because overlordship satisfied his aims better than 
annexation.  After Manuel forgave Armenian and Antiochene intransigence, he further 
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demonstrated his goodwill by gathering all his vassals in Outremer for a march against Nur 
ad-Din, which resulted in the release of thousands of Christian prisoners.  He was careful 
not to do too much to damage the sultan; his position depended in part on crusader fear of 
Syrian power. 
 The Byzantine position in Outremer continued to improve during the 1160s.  
Diplomatically, Manuel cemented his hold over Antioch with his marriage to Maria in 1161.  
He also enhanced his relations with Jerusalem by offering his daughter to Amalric.  Manuel 
was given another opportunity to display his magnanimity when Nur ad-Din assaulted the 
crusader fortress of Harim.  The relieving force was shattered.  Manuel sent a force to deter 
Nur ad-Din from pressing his advantage and later personally marched to western Syria to 
guarantee the safe release of many notables, excluding Raymond of Antioch.  Nur ad-Din’s 
withdrawal and his release of the prisoners are a testament of his respect for and fear of 
Byzantine power.  With the exception of Cilicia, Manuel was the master of all Outremer.   
 The emperor’s grand scheme to use the crusaders’ strength reached its apex in 1169 
with the expedition against Egypt.  Manuel envisioned a limited return of the rich Nile river 
delta to Byzantine control while helping to secure his ally’s western flank.  Rarely do 
generosity and gain combine so conveniently.  However, Frankish greed, fear, and 
impatience worked against Manuel’s success.  The opportunity was great enough for 
Byzantium to make another effort against Egypt with crusader assistance in 1177.  The 
emperor was able to count on crusader assistance for a number of such campaigns; the 
largest such effort came in 1176 for the crusade against Ikonion.  Baldwin and his knights 
fought, and died, with zeal and typical Latin bravado. 
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 Manuel was very successful in his dealings in Outremer.  He avenged the previous 
injustices his father and grandfather suffered at the hands of the crusaders.  His hold on 
Antioch was assured and unchallenged.  The knights of Outremer faithfully followed his 
banner.  There were, indeed, complications.  In religious matters, the crusaders never truly 
accepted Orthodox authority.  The patriarch installed in Antioch died in an earthquake in 
1170, and the Latin patriarch returned in triumph.214  An Orthodox patriarch was admitted 
in Jerusalem in the same year, but he also did not last long, as the city fell in 1187.  The 
Armenians were also problematic.  However, after the death of Mleh in 1174, Armenian 
power waned considerably.  By 1180, Cilicia was restored to Byzantine control.  These 
issues notwithstanding, the Byzantine position in Outremer was quite secure. 
 In the Balkans, Manuel enacted a policy of containment.  This policy continued until 
the 1160s, when the Hungarians proved to be too much trouble.  The emperor’s first major 
encounter in the Balkans occurred while he was preparing for the assault on the Norman 
garrison at Kekyra and the subsequent invasion of Italy.  His contemporaries, as well as 
modern historians, have questioned his motives in campaigning in the north.  The answer 
is that the Balkans were not a distant frontier zone; rather, this was the heartland of the 
empire.  Manuel could not tolerate any instability in this area and necessarily acted when 
the Hungarians and Serbs rose against him.  However, Manuel conducted a limited 
operation to keep his forces ready for the planned punitive expedition against Roger II. 
 During the 1150s, Manuel was obliged to launch a number of forays across the 
Danube.  Again, the scope of these campaigns was limited because Byzantium was 
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thoroughly engaged in Italy.  Although the majority of the troops in Italy were mercenaries, 
Manuel would still not risk a potential war on two fronts.  Therefore, the action in the 
Balkans during this period was restricted to quickly and efficiently crushing Hungarian, 
and sometimes Serbian, hostility so he could continue to focus on Italy. 
 The conclusion of Italian operations and the death of Hungarian King Géza II in 1162 
presented the emperor with a unique opportunity.  The Hungarians had been particularly 
annoying during the past decade.  Now that Manuel had a free hand, he sought to eliminate 
the Hungarian threat.  His attempt to control the Hungarian crown through diplomacy was 
ultimately unsuccessful.  Worse yet, his scheming created a larger problem as the new 
Hungarian king sought to relieve himself of the Byzantine yoke.  Manuel won the day by 
systematically dismantling the Hungarian diplomatic apparatus and destroying its army.  
The Balkans were peaceful for the rest of Manuel’s reign after 1168.  The emperor was even 
able to install his adopted son, Béla, on the Hungarian throne after 1172. 
 Manuel achieved his most significant and lasting victory in the Balkans.  This is 
expected, for Manuel stood to lose the most from any defeat or instability here.  The 
Hungarians were quite persistent; from 1148 until the final campaign in 1168, Manuel 
conducted no less than a dozen campaigns across the Danube.  Byzantine preoccupation in 
Italy during the 1150s and the strength of the Hungarian crown prevented Manuel from 
decisively settling matters in the Balkans at the time.  However, the emperor perceptively 
adapted his strategy after 1162.  Regardless of his initial failures, Manuel won full control 
of the Hungarian crown. 
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 Manuel demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to changing circumstances in 
Italy.  His first encounter with the West was with Roger II of Sicily, who capitalized on the 
emperor’s distraction with the Second Crusade by raiding several Byzantine islands in the 
Aegean.  Manuel immediately planned a reprisal to end the Norman menace that had 
plagued Byzantium for over a century.  His initial plan involved a joint effort with the 
Germans to crush the Normans. Manuel concluded the 1140s with the successful recapture 
of Corfu. 
 The deaths of Conrad III and Roger II in 1152 and 1154, respectively, complicated 
Byzantine aims for Italy.  Frederick, the new German emperor, was considerably less 
friendly to Constantinople, and it appeared less likely that there would be a joint venture 
against Sicily.  Therefore, Manuel aimed to attack Sicily by himself and used a disaffected 
member of its royal family to gain an aura of legitimacy in his involvement.  Manuel’s 
venture ultimately failed, forcing him again to modify his strategy.  Given the coolness in 
German-Byzantine relations, Manuel believed that William of Sicily would be more 
beneficial as an ally and vassal rather than an enemy. 
 During the 1160s, Manuel’s political intrigue in the west intensified as he sought 
new allies to counter the influence of Frederick Barbarossa.  One method that he employed 
was to try to persuade the pope to recognize him as the emperor of Rome.  To obtain that 
recognition, he was willing to acquiesce on a number of issues that divided Rome and 
Constantinople. Manuel failed in his negotiations precisely because he was so successful in 
curbing German influence and power.  In 1167, the German army was unable to complete 
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its victory over the Italian city-states after it was ravaged by disease.  The papacy no longer 
had any immediate need of a defender against the Germans.   
 Manuel did not give up his effort to curb German influence. He established a 
marriage alliance with one of the leading families in Rome.  It was apparently enough to stir 
the Germans into action.  After 1167, there was an exchange of diplomatic missives 
between Constantinople and the German court.  Manuel was willing to end hostilities with 
the Germans.  His alliance with Alexander III had not brought any glory to the empire.  If 
Manuel established peace with Barbarossa, he could reach an agreement that would 
guarantee Byzantine hegemony in northern Italy and the Balkans.  Barbarossa’s double-
cross was so intricate and well-developed that the Byzantines were utterly shocked when 
Alexander recognized Barbarossa as the legitimate emperor of Rome.   
 Manuel was ultimately unsuccessful in his dealings in Italy.  However, the extent of 
this failure should not be overstated.  The collapse of Byzantine influence in Italy was 
indeed unfortunate, but the Byzantine investment in Italy was relatively minor, especially 
compared to German losses.  After the Treaty of Venice, Manuel accepted that Italy was lost 
for the moment.  The loss at Myriokephalon and the subsequent instability on his eastern 
frontier necessitated his full attention. 
 Manuel is judged quite harshly regarding his policy towards the Seljuks of Rûm 
because of the contrast between the scale of his invasion in 1176 and the humiliation of his 
subsequent defeat at Myriokephalon.  The Byzantine policy in Anatolia was complex 
because of the nature of the potentates involved.  Manuel had to contend with not only the 
Seljuks, but also the marauding Turkomen of the steppe and the lesser principalities of the 
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northeast.  Manuel’s policy in this sphere of influence did not take form until the second 
decade of his reign.  The emperor’s assault on Ikonion in 1146 was largely a display to his 
western observers but also an answer to the challenge of his authority. 
 Anatolia was quiet for the first few years of the 1150s.  Indeed, Manuel fostered a 
friendly relationship with Masud of Ikonion.  He was even able to call upon the sultan for 
assistance against the Armenians.  The political landscape and Manuel’s imperial policy 
changed after the death of Masud I in 1156.  His son and successor, Kiliҫ Arslan II, cast a 
greedy eye on his brothers’ possessions in the east.  Manuel developed a policy to ensure 
that the Turks remained fractured.  He supported all of the brothers against the others in 
varying degrees of intensity.  This policy was quite effective.  Ikonion maintained a correct 
attitude vis-à-vis Constantinople for several years.  The satisfactory arrangement ended 
because of the emperor’s inappropriate march through Seljuk territory in 1159. 
 Manuel launched a series of dashing campaigns against Ikonion in the beginning of 
the 1160s and achieved great success.  In 1162, Arslan accepted client status, and Manuel 
later adopted Arslan as a son.  The emperor continued to support the sons of Masud against 
each other to ensure that Arslan would not become too powerful.  Additionally, Manuel 
maintained cordial relations with Nur ad-Din so that he had an ally on Arslan’s eastern 
flank.  This policy worked to Byzantine advantage as long as the Danishmendid princes 
were able to survive Arslan’s attacks.  However, the death of Yaghi-Basan in 1165 and the 
exile of Dhū’l Nūn and Shāhan-Shāh in 1168 seriously disrupted Manuel’s plans.  Now, the 
only check to Arslan’s power was Nur ad-Din to the east. 
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 The death of Nur ad-Din in 1174 removed the final obstacle from open conflict 
between Ikonion and Constantinople.  Manuel spent almost a year gathering his forces for 
his assault.  He utilized his vassals from Outremer and the Balkans to create a large host.  
He even petitioned Alexander III for support from the west.  The crusade against Ikonion 
was designed to legitimate his western policy as well as crush the power of the Seljuks.  
Manuel needed a grand Christian victory to restore the prestige lost after the failure of his 
expedition to Egypt, as well as the collapse of his efforts in Italy.  Arslan was not prepared 
to deal with this force and desperately sought to come to terms with Manuel.  Had Manuel 
not erred in his charge through the pass of Tzivritzē, Ikonion might well have been 
captured.  Myriokephalon was a stunning defeat for the Byzantines, but not a catastrophe. 
The number of defeats that Manuel inflicted upon Arslan after Myriokephalon is indicative 
of the continued strength of the Byzantine army.   
 That Manuel’s strategy was perceptive is evident in the events that transpired after 
his death.  His concern about the threat that Egypt could pose was fulfilled when Salah ad-
Din brought Egypt and Syria under his control and utilized his vast resources to declare 
jihad against the Franks.  In 1187, he inflicted a devastating defeat upon the crusaders at 
Hattin, where the greatest army the crusaders ever assembled was obliterated.  This began 
the slow death of Outremer.  In response to the loss of Jerusalem, the West dispatched a 
Third Crusade.  En route to the Holy Land, the crusaders sacked Ikonion in an offensive 
similar to 1176.  The crusaders broke through the mountain passes that protected the 
Seljuk capital’s western flank and shattered the sultan’s army.  Seljuk power never fully 
recovered.  The death of Kiliҫ Arslan in 1192 precipitated a civil war that further weakened 
the sultanate.  Rûm stagnated until its total collapse a century later in 1307. 
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 Byzantium under the Komneni made significant progress in restoring the power and 
prestige lost after Manzikert.  This was especially true under the leadership of Manuel I.  He 
transformed the empire from an insular regional power to an empire worthy of the name of 
Rome.  Because of his ability to adapt his strategy to changing circumstances, Manuel was 
able to achieve successes.  He came closer than any other Byzantine emperor to reclaiming 
the greatness of antiquity without exhausting his empire’s resources as Justinian or Basil II 
had.  His only unmitigated failure was his lack of preparation for the succession of his son.  
He overestimated the security of his wife’s position in Constantinople.  Furthermore, she 
exacerbated her own unpopularity by engaging in a number of shocking affairs.215   
Manuel’s daughter and her husband declared a holy war against the widowed 
empress Maria that tore the capital apart.  In 1182, Manuel’s cousin Andronicus returned to 
the capital and ushered in a period of chaos and bloodshed.  Within a year, he murdered 
Manuel’s wife, son, and daughter.  Andronicus, in turn, met an ignominious end at the 
hands of the Constantinopolitan mob.216  The empire never recovered from the collapse of 
the Komneni dynasty.  The doom of Byzantium is found here in the fracturing of the 
Komneni political system after Manuel’s reign, not during it. 
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